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This study examines the history of selected conflicts between re­source development and preservation at Glacier National Park. Early exploration, settlement, and resource development activities in the region severely conflicted with the desire of preservationists to establish it as a national park. When Congress set the park aside in 1910 several concessions were made in Glacier's Organic Act that- allowed continued resource development within park boundaries. The most serious and long lasting of these concessions involved a pro­vision granting the Reclamation Service permission to utilize "any area" of the park for maintenance or development of government rec­lamation projects. The Congressional bequest of such liberal access to the water resources of a national park constituted a major depar­ture from previous national park acts. The consequences for Glacier National Park were serious and persistent. The Sherburne Valley, on the park's east side, became a storage reservoir for the Milk River Irrigation Project even though Sherburne Dam was not planned at the time Glacier Park was established. Furthermore, the inclu­sion of utilitarian water development concessions in the Organic Act encouraged other attempts to construct dams in the park. In the late 1940s the Army Corps of Engineers proposed to build a dam in the North Fork Valley that would have flooded about 20,000 acres of Glacier National Park. The Corps' proposal set the stage for a major confrontation between resource developers and preservationists. The last two chapters of the thesis examine the North Fork conflict in detail.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Preservation of the natural environment never has been 
an easy task in the United States* The emergent tradition 
of Progress and material accomplishment fixed American atten­
tion on the labor of conquering a virgin continent; there was 
no time to waste. Natural resources, remolded by man *s in­
genuity, offered millions an opportunity to carve comfortable 
homes from wilderness. In an 1830 address to Congress, 
President Andrew Jackson expressed the predominant American 
desire to develop the continent's potentials. Jackson gen­
eralized for his countrymen:
What good man would prefer a country covered 
with forests and ranged by a few thousand 
savages to our extensive Republic, studded 
with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, 
embellished with all the improvements which 
art can devise or industry execute?
Development represented the powerful systolic pressure of
the American heart; preservation of nature was a feeble
diastolic movement.
In 1910 appreciation for the natural environment clearly
remained a secondary concern for most Americans. Passage of
the Glacier Park Act in May 1910 was possible only because
the park seemed not to stand in the way of future resource
development, for, firmly embedded in the Glacier Organic 
Act were a number of concessions to the utilitarian demand 
that development schemes not be impaired. Furthermore, the 
act included a provision for natural resource development 
which constituted a major innovation in national park legis­
lation. The Reclamation Service received authority to use 
any area within Glacier for development or maintenance of 
government reclamation projects. No previous national park 
act authorized such free accessibility to water resources. 
Glacier's reclamation provision quickly became a model for 
other parks.
Two factors explain the concessions to resource develop­
ment schemes written into the Glacier National Park Act. 
First, Congress considered the bill during a turbulent period 
of national debate on natural resource policies. Conserva­
tionists were split among themselves on natural resource 
issues. Utilita:rian conservationists advocated multiple- 
use development of all natural resources while aesthetic con­
servationists called for preservation of the most primitive 
and spectacular elements of the landscape. By 1910, the two 
wings of the conservation movement represented substantially 
differing goals and the cohesion which had characterized 
earlier periods disintegrated in the heat of the Progressive 
conservation crusade.
Secondly, resource use concessions within the Glacier 
Park bill stemmed from the ambiguous nature of the préserva-
tionist movement itself. Much of the preservation rhetoric 
obfuscated the fact that preservationists themselves advo­
cated both resource management and use. Naturalist John 
Muir, for example, delighted in seeing Americans wandering 
in the wilds; he wanted wildlands set aside for people who 
desired to escape from "car and dust and early death." It 
is true that Muir's "use" differed substantially from that 
advocated by utilitarian conservationists, but it was use 
nonetheless. Therefore, the fundamental difference between 
utilitarian and aesthetic conservationists was not whether 
to use or not to use resources, but how and to what degree. 
The ambivalence and ambiguity inherent in the preservation­
ist outlook accommodated some utilitarian developments in 
primitive areas. The Glacier Park bill stretched the accommo 
dation to the limit and thereby imperiled the preservation 
principle.
This study is an examination of conflicts between re ­
source development and preservation at Glacier National Park. 
It concentrates on debate whether or not to set Glacier 
aside and the consequences of ambiguous attitudes toward 
preservation. To understand the significance of the con­
flict it is necessary first to examine the period prior to 
the park’s establishment. For more than one hundred years 
attempts to develop the area’s natural resources dominated 
the minds of local and national leaders. This period es-
tablished solid patterns of settlement and natural resource 
utilization that significantly conflicted with the preser­
vationist idea.
CHAPTER II
THE INITIAL SETTING
Everything about the Americans, from 
their social condition to their laws, 
is extiAzÆlinary; but the most exti^o^i- 
nary thing of all is the land that 
supports them.
Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America
Lewis and Clark were the first Americans to break the 
isolation that encompassed the Northern Rockies. Although 
their expedition did not enter the area of present-day 
Glacier National Park it laid preliminary foundations upon 
which others would build.
The Lewis and Clark Expedition focused attention on 
the West as have few other events of American history. The 
focus was holistic, never narrow. Jefferson's three pages 
of instructions to the Expedition's leaders envisioned an 
extensive investigation of geographical information, com­
mercial possibilities, the nature of the soil, mineral de­
posits, and weather. In addition, the Indian inhabitants 
were to receive close scrutiny. Aboriginal numbers, social 
patterns, tribal alliances, housing, food, clothing, diseases.
laws and customs were to be recorded carefully.^ Jefferson's 
sweeping, comprehensive instructions set the tone of the 
Expedition, which in turn "keynoted what was to be a . . . 
flexible and economically mobile American approach to the 
West." In short, though interested in commerce, the Great 
Captains were charged with investigating "almost every 
phenomenon that might prove useful to settlers from the . 
United States.
The Expedition's legacy to those who later settled 
present-day Montana was especially rich. Jefferson instructed 
the leaders to examine the headwaters of the Missouri and 
Columbia watersheds and to locate, if possible, the "most 
direct and practicable water communications across this 
continent for the purpose of commerce. But, the existen­
tial reality of Montana geography proved a bitter disappoint­
ment to the centuries-old dream of a possible water route to 
Cathay across the North American Continent. The headwaters 
of both the Missouri and Columbia drainages proved much too 
shallow to accommodate navigation and the cordillera of the
^William H, Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire (New York: 
Random House, 1966), p. 5.
^Ibid., p . 6.
^Ibid.
^Quoted in Roy E. Appleman, Lewis and Clark: Historic 
Places Associated with Their Transcontinental Exploration 
( 1 8 0 4 - 1 8 0 6 )  (Washington. P . c T : ~ United States Department of 
the Interior, National Park Service, 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p. 4 .
Rockies constituted a formidable barrier, too high and wide 
to be bridged. Although negative discoveries of the Expedi­
tion, they meant that future development must be directed 
toward settlement of, not passage through, the region.
On the eastward return journey two events further out­
lined possibilities and limitations of the areas adjacent 
to present-day Glacier National Park, The first left a 
sketchy map of the northeastern portion of the Columbia 
River watershed. Unable to cash letters of credit provided 
by President Jefferson, the Expedition was obliged to spend 
five weeks with the Nez Perce Indians trading for provisions. 
During extensive talks with the Indians, Clark was able to 
draw a rough map of the Missoula, Jocko, Mission, and Flat­
head Valleys. The first outlines of the three forks of the 
Flathead River (called *Parkee* by the Indians) and the 
elusive Marias Pass were thus set down on paper. Although 
three-fourths of a century passed before the low defile of 
this pass would be officially 'discovered,' it was clearly 
marked on Clark's chart,^
The second major event on the return trip set a pattern 
for Indian-white relationships which endured for a full
Genevieve Murray, Marias Pass (Missoula, Montana: 
Historical Reprints, Sources of Northwest History, No. 12, 
n .d .), p. 5; and Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed ., Original Jour­
nals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1804-1806> 8 vols. 
(New York: Arno Press, 1969), Atlas, maps 42 and 43.
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quarter-century after the Expedition passed. Lewis and 
Clark decided to divide the Expedition at Traveller's Rest 
in the Bitter Root Valley; Clark would reconnoiter the 
Yellowstone region while Lewis reascended the Marias River 
to "ascertain whether any branch of that river lies as far 
north as LAT.^ 50. . . . Lewis' detour to the Marias was
part of a geo-political strategy aimed at strengthening 
future U. S. negotiations for the disputed northern boundary 
of the Louisiana Purchase. Lewis' effort failed. A few 
miles east of the present town of Browning, Montana, Lewis 
noted in his journal, "I now have lost all hope of the 
waters of this river [Marias] ever extending to N Latitude
750°." Obviously, the Marias River offered no advantages 
for future boundary negotiations.
Disappointed, Lewis and his three-man contingent turned 
south to rejoin their waiting comrades on the Missouri. 
However, a greater disappointment awaited. Lewis knew the 
Marias region was well within Blackfeet Indian territory. 
Earlier he had noted in his journal that he wished "to avoid
Qan interview" with the Blackfeet, whom he characterized as 
"a vicious lawless and reather [sic] an abandoned set of
^Thwaites, Original Journals, vol. 5, p. 175. 
^Ibid., p. 214. 
bid., p . 206.
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wretches. . . Despite Lewis’ wishes, the party sighted
eight Blackfeet shortly after turning south for the Mis­
souri; the dreaded "interview" was at hand. Both groups 
camped peacefully the night of June 26, 1806 but the next 
morning the Blackfeet attempted to steal weapons and horses 
from Lewis and his men. A struggle followed. Two Indians 
were killed and the rest fled. Fearing retaliation, Lewis 
led his men on a 120-mile forced march back to the Mis­
souri. In their wake, the Expedition left a smoldering 
distrust between Blackfeet and whites which endured for many 
d e c a d e s . T h e  incident served to keep American traders out 
of the area east of the present-day park and retarded settle 
ment.
®Ibid.
^°Ibid., pp. 223-227.
Letter, John C. Ewers to Helen B. West, quoted in
Helen B. West, Meriwether Lewis in Blackfeet Country (Brown­
ing, Montana: Museum of the Plains Indian, 1964), p. 2; 01 in 
D. Wheeler, The Trail of Lewis and Clark. 18 04-1904. 2 vols. 
(New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1904), p. 312, Wheeler relates 
an Indian account of the Marias fight given him by George 
Bird Grinnell; Hiram C. Chittenden, The American Fur Trade 
of the Far West. vol. 2 (New York : Barnes and Noble, T^TT)", 
p. 840. Chittenden claims that the Indians Lewis killed 
were Gros Ventres, whose frequent hostile acts were often 
blamed on the Blackfeet. Chittenden also asserts in volume 
2, page 705 that Manuel Lisa’s establishment of a fur trad­
ing post in Crow Country, traditional enemies of the Black­
feet, accounts for Blackfeet hostility toward whites --not 
Lewis’ actions on the Marias; see also John C. Ewers, 
"Intertribal Warfare as a Precursor of Indian-White Warfare 
on the Northern Great Plains," The Western Historical Quar­
terly, 6 (October 197 5): 397-410,
10
The incident on the Marias did not shake Lewis’ faith 
in the region's potential. Before the Expedition's twenty- 
eight month odyssey ended, Lewis shared some of his knowl­
edge of the West with two American fur hunters. "I gave 
them a short description of the Missouri," Lewis reported 
in his journal, "a list of distances to the most conspicuous
streams . . . and pointed out to them the places where the
12beaver most abounded." Lewis wished both men luck.
The British, not the Americans, however, were the 
first to exploit the region's resources. Under the leader­
ship of David Thompson, the indomitable explorer and fur 
trader, the North West Company extended operations from the 
Saskatchewan area in Canada to the Columbia's upper reaches. 
Although untutored, illiterate traders probably moved west 
of the Rockies as early as 1800,^^ Thompson's journals were the 
first historic records for the district. In 1807 Thompson 
erected Kootenay House on Lake Windemere near the Columbia's 
source. By late 1808, he extended the North West Company's 
territory again--this time to the south, Thompson sent his 
assistant, Finan McDonald, south to the Kootenai River in
1 2Thwaites, Original Journals, vol. 5, p. 175.
James M, Hamilton, From Wilderness to Statehood: A 
History of Montana. 1805-1900. ed. Merrill G. Burlingame 
(Portland, Oregon: Binfords and Mort, 1957), p. 61.
^^William S, Lewis and Naojiro Murakami, Ranald 
MacDonald (Spokane: Inland American Printing Co., 1923), 
p. llOff.
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present-day Montana to construct a log cabin and establish 
commercial ties with the I n d i a n s . T h e  Kootenay Indian 
tribe was the only band inhabiting the immediate vicinity 
of the new post but the outpost was located strategically 
to capture Kootenay, Flathead, Kalispel and Spokane Indian 
trade.
Competition for the rich fur trade soon materialized.
Joseph Howse, representing Hudson’s Bay Company, moved into
the Upper Flathead Country during the winter of 1810-1811
to gather information on Thompson’s North West Company
operations. Howse abandoned the area, however, in 1811
effectively ending Hudson’s Bay Company activity there for 
17a decade.
American fur hunters entered the field in 1812. Francis
Benjamin Fillet, acting for John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur
Company, moved into present-day northwestern Montana and a
18short-lived but lively rivalry quickly developed. In 1813 
Fillet and a North West Company principal fought a duel^^ 
over trade disagreements but the real battle for the interi-
^^T. C. Elliott, "The Fur Trade in the Columbia Basin 
Prior to 1811," Oregon Historical Quarterly, XV (December 
1914) :8, ------------------------------
^^Flora M, Isch, "History of the Upper Flathead Valley" 
(Master’s thesis. University of Montana, 1948), pp. 7, 32.
^^Hugh J. Biggar, "History of the Lower Flathead Valley" 
(Master’s thesis, University of Montana, 1951), pp. 46-47.
l^Isch, "Upper Flathead," p. 36.
l^Ross Cox, Adventures on the Columbia River (New York: n.p., 1832), p. 106” '
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or * s wealth was settled without a shot when Astor's Pacific
Fur Company became a casualty of the War of 1812. Rumors
that a British man-of-war would soon arrive at Astoria
2 0caused Astor's Pacific adventure to disintegrate.
Astor's withdrawal left the British in uncontested 
control of the upper-Columbia until Americans re-entered
21the field in the 1830s. Even then, competition was light. 
The highly profitable fur business faded during the 1840s 
as the new use of an old product, silk, made inroads on fur. 
The commerce in plews was moribund in the northwest by the 
1850s.
The importance of the fur trade era in Montana should 
not be underestimated. Until the 1850s this wilderness 
enterprise accounted for almost all exploration and dis­
covery in the region after Lewis and Clark. Yet, the com­
merce in beaver did not mean permanent settlement. Many 
valleys remained unexplored during even the peak of fur 
trade activity. No serious effort was made to penetrate 
the North Fork Valley, for instance, since Indians with
2 3whom traders dealt lived in valleys farther south or west.
2 0Hamilton, Wilderness, p. 64.
^^Isch, *'Upper Flathead,’* p. 41.
2 2Hamilton, Wilderness. p. 93; and K. Ross Toole, Mon- 
tana: An Uncommon Land (Norman: University of Oklahoma FTe'ss, 
Ï959), p. 55.
^^Biggar, ’’Lower Flathead,” p. 39,
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Furthermore, continued Blackfeet hostility both to trappers 
and other Indians, made valleys like the North Fork too dan­
gerous for even the most daring adventurer.
The decade of the 18 50s was an important transitional
period; Montana passed from the fur trade era and prepared
2 5for settlement. However, in the Upper Flathead Country 
the hiatus between fur trade and settlement lasted through 
the 18 50s and well into the 1860s. Several factors accounted 
for this. The failure of Governor Isaac I. Steven's Northern 
Pacific Railroad Survey to locate the mysterious Marias Pass 
during the 1853 reconnaissance of the Northern Rockies
2 fkshifted attention southward. Steven's establishment of
the Blackfeet and Flathead Reservations on the east and west
sides of the present park also acted to insulate the region,
2 7thus retarding white exploration and settlement.
The somnolent Upper Flathead Country roused a bit after 
1860. The 1863 Kootenay gold discoveries and an 1867 strike
Olga Weydemeyer Johnson, Flathead and Kootenay: The
Rivers and Tribes and the Region's Traders (Glendale, Calif.: 
Northwest Historical Series, #10, 1969), p . 310; Biggar, 
"Lower Flathead," p. 86; and Toole, Uncommon Land, p. 125.
2 5Hamilton, Wilderness, p. 93; and Toole, Uncommon Land,
p . 55.
^^Hamilton, Wilderness, pp. 114-118.
27Arnold William Bolle, "The Basis of Multiple Use Man­
agement of Public Lands in the North Fork of Flathead River, 
Montana" (Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1959), pp. 
39-40; and Donald H, Robinson, Through the Years in Glacier 
National Park, ed., Maynard C. Bowers (Kalispell, Montana: 
Thomas Printers, 1960), p. 28.
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on Libby Creek drew substantial interest from miners. A
few enterprising individuals attempted to tap the bonanza
market by running cattle north of Flathead Lake and selling
beef to packers. But when mineral supplies decreased the
miners drifted away. Without a close market the cattlemen
2 8soon followed. Activity remained light in the Upper
Flathead region for the next two decades. However, a few
people explored the North Fork Valley in hopes of finding
mineral resources. For example, Texan William Veach and
four other men reportedly discovered a thirty-ounce gold
2 9nugget in the creek flowing into Quartz Lake in 1876.
No rush developed, perhaps because the men found nothing 
else and drifted on to California without telling anyone 
of their discovery. Several other itinerant prospectors 
and fur trappers also tried their luck in the North Fork 
Valley during the 1870s and 1880s but found little and 
stayed only a short time.
The 1880s marked the beginnings of permanent settlement 
in the Upper Flathead Country. The major Indian problems of
^®Isch, "Upper Flathead," pp. 64-66.
2 9Robinson, Through the Years, p. 36.
^^Olga Weydemeyer Johnson, "The Story of the Tobacco 
Plains Country," Subject File, p. 69, Glacier National Park 
Archives, West Glacier, Montana. Hereafter cited GNPA.;
Mrs. Nat Collins, The Cattle Queen of Montana, ed, Alvin E. 
Dyer (Spokane, Wash.: Dyer Printing Co., n.d.), pp. 253-254; 
and Robinson, Through the Years, p. 36,
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the 1870s were over, Montana Territory was strongly garri­
soned, the buffalo were well on the way to extinction, and
the aboriginal population moved backstage in the minds of 
31most whites.
In 1881 the Northern Pacific Railroad steamed into
the Territory. By 1883 the line's western segment reached
Missoula and late in the year construction crews laid tracks
through the Hell Gate and on to Garrison. The Northern
Pacific, a substantial landowner in the new Territory by
virtue of generous land grants from the federal government,
promoted settlement along its lines. The Upper Flathead
indirectly benefited by the land promotions. Settlers who
could not find suitable land near the railroad, or workers
|who lost their jobs when initial construction activities
ended, drifted into valleys north of the Clark Fork River.
Settlement was rapid after 1883. The estimated population
of the Upper Flathead Valley by 1890 was 3000.^^
The discovery of Marias Pass by John F. Stevens in 
331889 and subsequent construction of the Great Northern 
Railroad through the Upper Flathead and on to the coast set 
the stage for accelerated development of the area. In 
frenzied anticipation, several towns grew rapidly. Joseph M
^^Toole, Uncommon Land, p. 132.
^^Isch, "Upper Flathead," p. 71.
33Robinson, Through the Years, p. 32.
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Dixon, later an influential Montana Senator, described two 
of the area's most promising new towns. He characterized 
Demersville, at the head of navigation on the Flathead 
River, as
. . . a typical new western town, hardly a
year old [in August 1891], houses mostly 
planked up and down, six or seven hundred 
inhabitants, something like twenty 'real 
estate* offices, some of them canvas tents, 
and, . . .  43 saloons. . . .
Columbia Falls, twenty-five miles further up the Flat­
head River was, in Dixon * s words, ’’superlatively newer,"
Dixon noted that it had been only five months since the first 
house was constructed
. . . yet, the town boasted 500 inhabitants, 
water works, electric lights, a $40,000 
hotel - yet to be - . . . and many other
improvements, most of which I found to beon paper.35
Clearly, the Upper Flathead Valley had all the trappings of 
a bustling frontier by the time of Dixon’s visit. If that 
activity was to be sustained, however, valley residents 
would need to draw increasingly upon the region’s natural 
resources. Not surprisingly, they quickly turned their atten 
tion to just that.
Coal, discovered in 1886 by Frank Emmerson near Coal
Jules Alexander Karlin, "Young Joe Dixon in the Flat­
head Country," Montana, the Magazine of Western Histoi^, 17 
(January 1967]:17.
17
Creek in the North Fork Valley, became the focus of early 
resource development schemes.^^ James Talbott, a Columbia 
Falls promoter, organized the Northern International Im­
provement Company to develop the North Fork's coal re­
sources. Talbott's company laid out a town site near the 
coal banks and made plans to transport coal down the North 
Fork River to Columbia Falls. He hoped that a ready supply 
of coal would entice Great Northern Railroad managers to
locate their line's division point at Columbia Falls where
37he and others owned substantial real estate.
Talbott's North Fork coal enterprise got under way in 
1892. The Oakes, a seventy-five foot, double engine, sin­
gle boiler steam-wheeler, left its Columbia Falls moor­
ings in May and began churning up the flood-swollen waters 
of the main Flathead River. Three miles above Coram, at 
Red Lick Rapids, the crew encountered their first crisis. 
With the boiler stoked to the limit the boat splashed wildly 
through the rapids. Just as the craft edged past the last
Charlie S. Shaw, The Flathead Story (Missoula, Mont.: 
United States Department of Agriculture, 1964), p. 51; and 
Historical Information concerning the Upper Flathead Country 
(Kalispell, Mont.: Trippet's Printers, 1971), p. 58. This 
work states that a cable raft operated on the North Fork 
bringing out coal as early as 1883. This date is not con­
firmed by any other accounts and one can only assume the 
1883 to be a typographical error which should read "1893".
37Robinson, Through the Years, p. 44; and Historical 
Information, p. 4TI
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of the turbulent waters she lost power; two engines were 
too much for a single boiler. The Oakes began drifting 
dangerously down the river's narrow channel. Two crew 
members rowed ashore desperately in a tender, and wrapped 
a rope around the nearest tree. The drifting boat halted. 
After a delay to secure more hauling line, the crew nudged 
the boat back into the main channel. Another crisis came 
just below Lower Canyon Creek on the North Fork of the 
Flathead. The Oakes, caught by the swift current, was 
driven out of the main channel and spent several desperate 
minutes whirling round-and-round among drifting logs and 
debris. Once again, lines were put ashore ; the drifting 
boat stopped. A power winch and line assisted the craft 
past the swift water. A few miles north of Canyon Creek, 
however, the Oakes literally came to the end of its rope. 
Swift current again demanded the use of the power winch 
and lines attached to large trees on the river's banks. 
Unfortunately, the boat began to rock under the strain of 
the tow line and the current beating against her sides.
As the craft pitched she took in water. The rocking motion 
increased. Suddenly the $5,000 stearnwheeler capsized, 
rolled completely over and, within minutes, tore asunder. 
That was the end of steamboat navigation on the North Fork 
River,
3 8Robinson, Through the Years, pp. 45-47.
19
Talbott tried to bring coal out of the North Fork one
more time the following year. Encouraged by a visit to
Columbia Falls from Copper King Marcus Daly, Talbott dis-
3 9patched six men overland to the coal deposits. The men 
whip-sawed enough lumber at the mine site to construct a 
raft capable of floating half a boxcar of coal to Columbia 
Falls. They completed the trip down the river without 
major incident. For the first time, a large quantity of 
coal was delivered at Columbia Falls, However, an effort 
to duplicate the success ended in failure when a second raft 
tore apart and the crew quit. Talbott reluctantly gave up 
the enterprise. Coal exploitation would have to wait a 
more sane avenue of transportation than the one offered by 
the North Fork River.
1892 and 1893 thus marked the first efforts, supported 
by substantial capital, to tap North Fork resources. Tal­
bott 's failure was not surprising since the valley was ex­
tremely rugged and isolated. Furthermore, the North Fork 
River was an incorrigible transportation route. Talbott's 
exertions proved the river too swift to navigate during high
% qShaw, Flathead Story, p. 53.
^^Robinson, Through the Years, p. 50,
41 During the 1920s the Coal Creek coal mine was leased 
to Claude Elder, who successfully operated it until the late 
1930s when demand for low-grade coal decreased. No one 
tried to operate the mine after Elder. The 1964 owner of 
the coal claim was the First National Bank of Butte. See 
Shaw, Flathead Story, p. 53.
20
water; during low water the rocky channels promised to rip 
the bottom out of any but the smallest boat.
The failure to develop coal deposits in the North Fork 
did not mean a complete withdrawal of interest from the 
valley. H. B. Ayres, in an 1899 report on the Flathead 
Forest Reserve, noted minor prospecting, logging, and home­
steading activity in the North Fork Valley. "About thirty 
cabins were seen," Ayres reported, "but only two of these 
were occupied; one at the coal banks on Coal Creek, and one 
on Bowman Creek. Two on Camas Creek were kept in repair 
and seem to be occupied during a part of the year." Ayres 
also observed that a man named Chilsom cut several thousand 
board feet of timber on Logging Creek for the Columbia Falls 
Mill Company in the early 1890s. The timber was left to 
rot, however. Low prices and transportation difficulties 
probably accounted for the fact that North Fork timber was 
not marketed at Columbia F a l l s . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the 
activity Ayres observed, the North Fork remained essentially 
undisturbed until the twentieth century.
Oil, not coal, was the next magnet to draw attention to 
the North Fork in 1901. Oil had been observed in the area 
around Kintla Lake (near the U.S.-Canadian border) as early
H. B. Ayres, The Flathead Forest Reserve. an extract 
from the Twentieth Annual Report of the U. S. Geological 
Survey. U7 S . Department o f ^ n t  error. Farf~V , Forest Re­
serves (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900),
pp. 283-284.
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as 18 9 2 but the expense of getting heavy equipment into so
remote a region probably discouraged early drilling. Yet,
in 1901, a group of Butte businessmen pushed a forty-mile
road north from Lake McDonald to the foot of Kintla Lake.
The road was a crude affair. No grading was done and logs
were placed in marshy areas to effect a corduroy path over
which heavy equipment could be h a u l e d . T h e  drilling
paraphernalia arrived over the road to the base of Kintla
Lake late in the year. As soon as the lake froze solidly,
crews dragged the material to the head of the lake; drilling
began in November. The Butte Oil Company invested $30,000
44in the operation by the end of the year.
An oil boom quickly materialized. Speculators moved
in and land prices skyrocketed as
Practically every foot of the country along 
the north fork [sic] of the Flathead River 
from the international boundary to the Great 
Northern Railroad [fifty miles to the south] 
was covered with claims.45
Claims valued at $5 before the oil boom sold for $25 to $100
afterward. Observers who followed the new oil field’s
development made sanguine predictions about the future.
P. W. Francis, writing for the Rocky Mountain Magazine, noted
4 3Robinson, Through the Years, p. 40.
^^Don Douma, "Second Bonanza: The History of Oil in
Montana," Montana, the Magazine of Western History 3 CAutumn 
1953): 20.  ^
p. 19.
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There is no more beautiful region in the 
whole northwest than this virgin wilder­
ness, which the enterprise of man will 
soon convert into a populous and busy 
territory, with all the industries of a 
great oil field in full blast.
P. W. Francis and hundreds of other men of his faith 
were wrong. Commerical quantities of the 'black gold' were 
not discovered in the North Fork Valley.
After 1903 the oil boom died in the North Fork Valley.
Oil rigs were left to rust, silent reminders of a wilderness 
4 8adventure. But not everyone abandoned the valley. Sparse 
settlement remained in the hope that known coal deposits or 
possible oil reserves would yet be developed. Rumors that 
a railroad might be constructed through the valley added to 
incentives for staying. Settlement characterized the North 
Fork Valley by 1907--widely scattered--but permanent nonethe­
less. Along the river that Indians called for centuries the 
'Parkee' white settlement was ensconced.
East of the Continental Divide, development and settle­
ment patterns were generally later and less permanent than 
west of the Divide. Rumors of rich copper deposits in the 
Swiftcurrent Valley began as early as 1889. Prospectors 
could not legally enter the area, however, since it was part 
of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation and therefore closed to 
mineral entry. Montana businessmen and the state legislature 
pressured the federal government to purchase the mountainous
47lbid., p. 20,
^^Robinson, Through the Years, p. 40.
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strip along the reservation's west side. In 1895, a three- 
man commission, including naturalist George Bird Grinnell, 
successfully negotiated a $1,500,000 purchase from the 
Blackfeet Indian T r i b e . O n  April 15, 1898 the "Ceded 
Strip" opened to prospecting and settlement. The Swift- 
current Valley quickly became the center of mining activity. 
The town of Altyn, consisting of "a dozen or so buildings,
. . . a post office, a store, several saloons and dance 
halls, a two story hotel, and a few tent-houses and cabins" 
at the head of Upper Sherburne Lake, experienced a rapid 
cycle of boom and then bust between 1899 and 1900. Despite 
frenzied activity, prospectors found no rich ore deposits.
An oil boom in the Swiftcurrent Valley quickly followed 
declining interest in copper. Sam Somes, a hotel operator 
in Altyn, discovered small pools of oil in a mining tunnel 
at the mouth of Lower Sherburne Lake in 1901. By 1903 
several oil companies formed to develop the oil resources, 
but their promotions were no more successful than earlier 
attempts in the North Fork, The oil boom in the Swiftcurrent 
Valley ended by 1907.^^
49James W. Sheire, Glacier National Park Historic Re­
sources Study (Washington, B.C.: U. S. Department of the 
Interior, National Park Service, 1970), pp. 119-120; and 
U. S., Department of Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, 
Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1896), p . 34.
^^Robinson, Through the Years, pp. 37-40.
^^Ibid., pp. 40-43.
( 2 4
Concurrent with mining and oil exploration was an in­
terest in developing the water resources of the St. Mary 
River and tributaries. As early as 1891, the Chief Engineer 
for the Department of the Interior investigated the feasi­
bility of diverting St. Mary River waters to the Milk River
for agricultural use near Havre, Montana. The engineer
5 2reported favorably on the project. The newly created U. S.
Reclamation Service authorized both the Milk River project
53and the St. Mary storage and diversion scheme. The need 
for an agreement with Canada on water distribution for both 
rivers, however, delayed major construction activity in the 
St. Mary area.
Attempts to develop the natural resources in and around 
present-day Glacier National Park represented the predominant 
interest of local, state and national governments. The ex­
ploitive emphasis severely conflicted with the idea of pre­
serving the area’s natural environment. It did not, however, 
totally preclude the preservationist idea.
S 2U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclama­
tion, Project Histories and Reports of Reclamation Projects, 
1902-19 25. Reel 83, Vol. 20, St. Mary Storage Unit of Milk 
River Project: Feature History. 1912 (Washington, D ,C .: 
National Archives, Record Group 115, Microfilm M-96, Records 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, 1902-1925), volume 3, p. 181. 
Hereafter cited as Project Histories plus citation of specific 
feature history.
5 3U. S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclama­
tion, Reclamation Project Data (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1961}, p . 343.
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An appeal to set the area aside as a national park was 
registered as early as 1883, In a letter printed in the 
Fort Benton River Press, Lieutenant John T, Van Orsdale 
wrote ;
I sincerely hope that publicity now being
given to that portion of Montana will re­
sult in drawing attention to the scenery 
which surpasses anything in Montana or ad­
jacent territories. A great benefit would 
result to Montana if this section could be 
set aside as a national park. . . .54
Lieutenant Van Orsdale was familiar with the Glacier area 
because he and Lieutenant Charles A, Woodruff made a military 
reconnaissance through the region in 1873,^^ The publicity 
to which Van Orsdale referred was the result of the 1882-83 
Northern Transcontinental Survey led by mining expert and 
geologist Raphael Pumpelly. Pumpelly's survey conducted 
under the auspices of Henry Villard's NorthemPacific Rail­
road investigated the mineral and agricultural resources in
the territory adjacent to the r a i l r o a d . V a n  Orsdale had
accompanied the Northern Transcontinental Survey. His 
letter to the River Press represented a general appreciation 
on the part of Pumpelly*s Survey of Glacier * s scenic beauty.
Widespread appreciation for Glacier's unique scenic
Robinson, Through the Years, p. S3, citing letter, 
John T . Van Orsdale printed in the Fort Benton River Press, 
September 1883.
^^Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 97,
^^Ibid., p. 103,
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attractions gained impetus after naturalist George Bird
Grinnell visited the present-day park in 1885. Charmed by
the beauty of the area, Grinnell returned East and wrote
fourteen installments on the area for his magazine Forest
and Stream. Grinnell*s articles brought national atten-
5 7tion to the area.
In September 1891, while exploring the Upper St. Mary
Lakes region, Grinnell mused in his field diary:
How would it do to start a movement to buy the 
St. Marys country say 30 X 20 miles from the 
Piegan Indians at a fair valuation and turn it 
into a national reservation or park[?] The 
Great Northern R.R. would probably back the 
scheme and T.C. Power would do all he could 
for it in the Senate. . . . certainly all the
Indians would like it. This is worth think­
ing and writing about.58
Grinnell*s ’scheme* received an unexpected boost when Presi­
dent Grover Cleveland established the Lewis and Clark Forest
Reserve in 1897 . The Reserve included the * Ceded Strip * and
all the western side of present-day Glacier National Park, 
Preservation of the area seemed assured, the mineral entry 
provisions notwithstanding.
But 1897 also marked a watershed in forest management. 
The first Forest Reserve Act of 1891 provided no instruc­
tions for utilitarian management of reserves. Preservation-
5 8George Bird Grinnell, "Field Notes, September 17, 
1891" (Los Angeles, Calif.: Southwest Museum, Item 320), 
no pagination.
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ists looked upon the 1891 Act as an effective vehicle for 
leaving the forests "untouched. For preservationists, 
a national forest reserve was tantamount to national park 
s t a t u s . B u t  the Forest Management Act of 1897 provided 
legal machinery for scientific forestry management. The 
1897 Act was an opening wedge for 'wise use* conservation­
ists like Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot.^^ The Act thwarted 
efforts by irrigation, game and park preservationists to 
keep the reserves free of lumbering, grazing and mineral en­
try. In short,
The Act paved the way for federal officials 
in the future to permit grazing, commercial 
lumbering, and hydroelectric generation 
within the forests, and to establish the 
national forests program clearly as one most 
concerned with rational d e v e l o p m e n t .^2
George Bird Grinnell and others only slowly realized 
the changing patterns of forest legislation. As late as 
1901 Grinnell enthusiastically predicted a bright future 
under Forest Reserve protection for the Upper St. Mary Lake 
region :
59Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Effi­
ciency: The Progressive Conservation MovemenF, 1890-1920 [New 
York : Atheneum, 1974), p. 36.
^^For a discussion of John Muir's attitude toward forest 
reserves, see Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 
revised ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1973) , p p . 133- 
136.
^^Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 36.
^^Ibid., p. 37.
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Happily, in 1897, by the official initiative 
of the United States Forest Commission . . . 
a large section of this mountain country was 
made into a forest reserve, including Upper 
St. Mary’s Lake. Under faithful and intelli­
gent supervision . . .  in due time Montana 
will rejoice . . . that so large a source of
her water-supply has thus been preserved for 
her people.63
Grinnell*s statement indicates that he was relatively com­
fortable with the Forest Reserve status the area enjoyed' as 
late as 1901. Contrary to some interpretations, Grinnell 
did not call for national park status of the Glacier area 
in 1901.
Yet, by 1903 the division between scientific management
advocates like Pinchot and preservationists was clear.
Pinchot, in a May 1903 address to the Society of American
Foresters, declared:
The object of our forest policy is not to pre­
serve the forests because they are beautiful 
. . . or because they are refuges for the wild
creatures of the wilderness . . . [our object
is] the making of prosperous homes. . . .
Every other consideration comes as secondary.
^^George Bird Grinnell, ’’Crown of the Continent,” Cen­
tury Magazine, September 1901, p. 672.
^^Several secondary works cite Grinnell*s "Crown of the 
Continent" article as the first serious call for national park 
status in the northern Rockies. See Robinson, Through the 
Years. p. 53; and Sheire, Historic Resources Study. p. 112.
See also. Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 190 for a discussion 
of preservationist ideas vis à vis the Forest Management Act 
of 1897. Grinnell*s article was similar to the efforts by 
irrigators to have forest areas set aside for watershed pro­
tection. See Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 23,
^^Mays, Gospel of Efficiency, pp. 41-42.
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Pinchot*s statement, coupled with his drive to have the 
Forest Reserves removed from the stewardship of the Depart­
ment of the Interior and placed under the Department of 
Agriculture’s jurisdiction, was an unequivocal move to es­
tablish a policy of development within the Forest Reserves.
On February 1, 1905 the Reserves were transferred to Agri­
culture. Pinchot and the utilitarians were now fully in. 
charge of the Forest Reserves.
The time to push for national park status of Glacier 
was clearly at hand. When the copper and oil excitement 
died, Grinnell approached Montana Senator Thomas H. Carter
7with the idea of setting aside Glacier as a national park.
A confrontation followed between those who wanted to continue 
the region’s development and those who desired to preserve it 
for the enjoyment of posterity.
^^Ibid., p p , 43-44.
6 7Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 184.
CHAPTER III
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK; PRECEDENTS AND PRESERVATION
The president [Taft] said the subject 
of conservation was rather abstruse.
'But,* he said, amid laughter, 'there 
are a great many people in favor of 
conservation no matter what it means.*
Great Falls Tribune 
May 1, 1910
In his book Glacier National Park Historic Resources 
Study, James W, Sheire characterizes the legislative process 
culminating in the establishment of Glacier National Park as 
"quiet and uneventful. Sheire contends that the effort to 
set aside
Glacier does not stand as a classic battle in 
American conservation or environmental his­
tory . With the exception of the small Montana 
community of Kalispel and [a] few senators and 
representatives, nobody opposed the park.2
Sheire further states that "the [utilitarian] conservation­
ists did not oppose the bill. Although some conservâtion- 
ists held "minor" reservations, their wise-use objections 
were sufficiently minor that they did not conflict with the
^Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 184. 
^Ibid., pp. 184-85.
^Ibid., p. 185,
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basic preservation objective,^ Sheire is not alone in his 
assessment of the legislative process which culminated in 
the establishment of Glacier National Park. Most standard 
interpretations of Glacier's history pass over the period 
from 1907 to May 1910 as quickly as possible.^
Yet, the two and a half year period when park supporters 
and opponents hammered out the organic act is enormously.sig­
nificant for understanding much of Glacier's subsequent his­
tory. A careful study of that period clearly demonstrates 
that both local and national interest groups strongly opposed 
establishment of Glacier National Park until major conces­
sions for resource exploitation were written into the park 
bill. The passage of the Glacier bill through Congress was 
'quiet and uneventful' only because preservationists did not 
put up 'a classic battle' against 'wise use* conservationists. 
Preservationist failure to engage in the battle at Glacier 
constituted a major breakdown in their efforts to defend and 
articulate the principle of National Park inviolability.
Montana Republican Senator Thomas H. Carter introduced a 
bill to establish Glacier on December 11, 1907. Carter 
modeled the bill after the Yellowstone Act of 1872, except 
that the new park was to be placed under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Agriculture--not under Interior,
^Ibid.
Robinson, Through the Years, pp. 53-55,
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Local reaction to Carter's Glacier bill developed even 
before the Senator introduced legislation. Opponents ob­
jected to provisions restricting settlement in the North 
Fork. They called attention to the fact that 150 applica­
tions for settlement in the valley were pending approval in 
the General Land Office. Furthermore, the boundaries of 
the proposed park included the Kintla oil fields. Many • 
local people still hoped the oil wells would produce com­
mercial quantities of crude oil. The anti-park people cited 
drilling reports which indicated that, although great pro­
duction could probably not be hoped for, the quality of the 
oil already found was high and therefore would not require 
great amounts to be highly profitable.  ̂ Local opponents also 
stressed their concern that a park would seriously interfere 
with the year-round forest product industries in the Kalis- 
pell area. With timber locked up in the park, they argued, 
development would be seriously restricted. Senator Carter 
attempted to allay local fears. He insisted that the park 
would be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture with
othe "sympathetic touch of forest rangers." Local opponents 
remained unconvinced.
Kalispell (Montana) Inter Lake, November 15, 1907,
P* 1. Hereafter cited as Inter Lake.
7Michael Anderson, "Local Opposition to Glacier National 
Park" (Seminar paper. University of Montana, 1972), p. 12.
o
Inter Lake, January 3, 1908, p. 1.
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As indicated above the most serious local resistance 
came from west of the Continental Divide. People in 
Kalispell, Columbia Falls and settlers in the North Fork 
vigorously objected to the inclusion of agricultural lands 
within the boundaries of the park. Hunting restrictions 
also were felt to be inimical to local rights. Petitions 
and letters emphasizing such views were sent to many Mon-
9tana representatives. Stanley Logan, a prominent Kalispell 
lawyer, pictured opposition to the park in broad terms. He 
strongly implied political retaliation if Carter did not 
make adjustments to the park bill. "The Montanan," Logan 
reminded Republican Carter, "loves the wild free life . . . 
and it makes him careworn, pessimistic and inclined to vote 
the Democratic ticket when he feels he is being pestered by 
such regulations."^^
Carter responded to Logan in a letter printed in the 
Daily Inter-Lake. He insisted that the Glacier Park legis­
lation would have beneficial effect on the immediate area 
around the park. According to the Senator, a park would 
mean more jobs and increased business for the adjacent re­
gion. Carter estimated $1,000,000 would be added to the 
local economy on the park's west side.
g Inter Lake, December 20, 1907, p..4. 
^^Inter Lake, December 27, 1907, p. 1, 
^^Inter Lake, January 3, 1908, p. 1.
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George Bird Grinnell supported local lobbying efforts 
to convince Kalispell area residents that their interests 
would be best served by the proposed park. Grinnell later 
commented that without local support "it was clear that 
there was little prospect of securing [the Glacier] legis-
II12lation. . . .  Grinnell believed it was necessary
. . . to convince the local people that it
was to their material advantage to have the
region protected, and it was not hard work 
to make them understand that a considerable 
invasion of travelers into their section 
would help it.
Local people may easily have been convinced that tourism 
would benefit local economies but they were not at all sure 
that it should exclude natural resource development.
The letters, petitions and Inter Lake editorials were 
not wasted on Senator Carter. In February 1908, Carter in­
troduced Senate Bill 5648 to supersede his first Glacier Park
bill. The second bill took local objections into account.
It allowed right of entrance and exit to all surveyed lands 
and validated mining claims existing within park boundaries 
prior to January 1, 1908. Also, in the new bill the Secre­
tary of Agriculture received the right to approve private 
summer cottages. Carter's modified bill incorporated some 
of the utilitarian objectives of the local people and to
12George Bird Grinnell, "King of the Mountain," Ameri- 
can Forests 3 5 (August 1929]: 491.
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that measure lessened their opposition to the park.^"^
For the next two years opposition shifted from a 
strictly local level to one more national. From 1908 to 
1910 the Glacier National Park bill took shape against the 
background of a national discussion on conservation. By 
1908 conservationists and preservationists engaged in acri 
monious debate on several issues; San Francisco's request 
to utilize the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National 
Park for city water supplies dominated the debate. The 
controversy drove conservationists into opposing camps.
By the time the Hetch Hetchy dispute was settled (in favor 
of utilitarians), the leaders of the two camps no longer 
communicated with each o t h e r . T h e  consequences of that 
polarization for Glacier National Park legislation was two 
fold. First, the Hetch Hetchy battle absorbed the lion * s 
share of preservationist interest and r e s o u r c e s . I n  com
^^Anderson, "Local Opposition," pp. 14-15.
^^Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 197; Muir and Pinchot 
broke personal relations as early as the summer of 1897 over 
the issue of sheep grazing permits in forest reserves. See, 
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, pp. 137-38. Muir 
and other preservationists were purposely not invited to 
attend the Governor's Conference held at the White House in 
1908 which President Roosevelt called to encourage natural 
resource discussions. See, Holway R. Jones, John Muir and 
the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite (San Francisco:
Sierra Club, 1965), p . 95.
^^Preservationist financial resources have been histori 
cally meager. The 1901 Right of Way Act, which granted lib­
eral access to three California National Parks, "for . . .
canals, ditches, pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or
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parison, Glacier seemed only a small issue. Secondly, the 
Hetch Hetchy rivalry hardened Gifford Pinchot in his deter­
mination to oppose new parks unless they incorporated his
17utilitarian views of resource management. The Glacier 
Park legislation suffered from the buffeting of intra­
conservationist battles.
Carter's second Glacier bill was not satisfactory to 
the Pinchot forces since it restricted timber harvests to 
local settlers. The Forest Service proposed a counter 
measure to insure that mature, as well as dead and down 
timber, could be removed by any citizen of the United States. 
Also included in the Pinchot measure were provisions allowing
water power development and railroad construction within park 
18boundaries. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and the
other water conduits, and for domestic, public, or other bene­
ficial uses,” slipped past preservationists because they had 
not the financial resources to maintain vigilant surveillance 
of all national resource legislation. Quoted in John I se,
Our National Park Policy: A Critical History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 86. The cost of paying experts to 
present the preservationist viewpoint at various hearings also 
strained their resources. See Jones, John Muir, pp. 90, 152. 
Preservationist organizations sometimes lost cohesiveness dur­
ing the Hetch Hetchy struggle. The Sierra Club was forced to 
set up a front organization called the Society for the Preser­
vation of National Parks in 1909 to take the heat off the 
Sierra Club for its strong opposition to the Hetch Hetchy res­
ervoir. Also, when the Appalacian Mountain Club wavered in 
its opposition to the Hetch Hetchy project the Society for the 
Preservation of National Parks invaded the Eastern club's 
territory and established a rival branch. See Jones, John 
Muir, pp. 97-117, 119-20.
^^Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 195,
l^Ibid.
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Secretary of the Interior supported the amendments. They
suggested the bill not pass unless the change became part of
the park act. Significantly, Secretary of the Interior
James Rudolph Garfield agreed with the Forest Service that
the provision in the bill leaving this par­
ticular park to supervision of the Secretary 
of Agriculture is proper, because he has a 
supervisor, rangers, and other necessary 
officials all ready to care for the area.
For that reason the park would be fully pro­
tected without extra expense to the Govern­
ment . 20
Secretary Garfield * s recommendation was in no way inconsis­
tent with his basic beliefs that resources should be used; a
month later he approved the city of San Francisco's applica-
21tion to dam Hetch Hetchy. For the remainder of the second 
session of the Sixtieth Congress the Glacier Park bill met 
increasing opposition and finally died for lack of réconcilia
In the Sixty-first Congress Carter introduced Senate 
Bill 2777 to establish Glacier Park. The bill went to the
19Letters, James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, and 
James Rudolph Garfield, Secretary of the Department of In­
terior , dated 16 April and 15 April 1908; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Public Lands, Glacier National Park in 
Montana. S. Rept. 106, 61 Cong., 2d sess., January 20, 1910, 
Senate Miscellaneous Reports 1:2-4, hereafter cited as 
Senate Report 106.
^^Letter, James R. Garfield, 15 April 1908.
21Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p. 161.
2 2Anderson, ”Local Opposition,” pp. 16-18.
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Committee on Public Lands where Montana Senator Joseph M. 
Dixon gave it sympathetic treatment. On January 20, 1910 
the bill was sent back to the Senate chamber for considera­
tion. The new legislation included several important changes 
Now under the Secretary of the Interior, the bill allowed 
cutting of mature as well as dead or down timber. The Sec­
retary also gained authority to grant railroad right-of-
ways along the "Flathead or any of its tributaries within
23the boundaries of said Glacier National Park." At the
suggestion of the Department of the Interior, Dixon added
an amendment to the bill on February 9, 1910, which read:
. . . the United States Reclamation Service 
may enter upon and utilize for flowage or
other purposes any area within said park
which may be necessary for the development 
and maintenance of a government reclamationproject.24
The reclamation amendment was to facilitate irrigation proj­
ects for the Blackfeet Indians at Lower Two Medicine Lake and
for settlers along the line of the Great Northern Railway.
In late January 1910, Secretary of the Interior Richard 
Ballinger wrote to Knute Nelson, Chairman of the Senate Com­
mittee on Public Land, expressing concern about the Glacier 
Park bill. As then constituted, Ballinger complained, the
23Senate Report 106, pp. 2-4.
.S ., Congress, Senate, Senator Dixon offering amend­
ment to Glacier National Park bill, 61st Cong., 2d sess.,
9 February 1910, Congressional Record 45:1639.
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bill did not "confer upon the Interior Department the au­
thority to construct a reservoir at the St. Mary Lakes, and 
the works in connection with said reservoir, in accordance 
with the plans adopted by the Department for the St. Mary 
Irrigation p r o j e c t . T h e  Secretary said that $300,000 
already had been expended on the project. Ballinger re­
quested an amendment to protect Interior's investment.
Dixon's reclamation amendment superbly met Ballinger's so­
licitation. No Senator rose to challenge the reclamation 
provision ; attention turned to discussion of the railroad 
amendment.
The amendment to grant rights-of-way to railroads within
park boundaries interested several groups. First, Kalispell
and North Fork residents believed the North Fork route would
be an important north-south commercial connection with Canada.
No other feasible route existed save for the North Fork Valley.
An editorial in the Inter Lake noted tersely;
If the creation of the Park is to mean the 
erection of a barrier to railroad building, 
then we had better be without the park.26
Some local people were skeptical, also, about the Great Northern
2 5Letter, Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger to 
T. Knute Nelson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Public Lands, 
dated January 28, 1910, quoted in "Chronological Summary," 
Glacier View Dam. File 0-44-4, GNPA, hereafter cited as 
Glacier View Dam IV. The history of Reclamation projects 
east ot the Continental Divide will be discussed in chapter 4
Editorial, Inter Lake, February 9, 1910, p. 4.
40
support for Glacier Park. They thought it possible that
Great Northern’s strategy was to lock up any possible
passes within the park thus preventing competition from
2 7other railroads.
Two railroads were interested in the North Fork Valley: 
the Great Northern and the Milwaukee. In 1909, with park 
legislation stalled in the Congress, both railroads employed 
crews to survey a route through the valley hoping that the 
first company to file survey plats would thereby gain a 
franchise for future North Fork railroad construction. If 
this could be done prior to Congressional passage of a 
Glacier Park bill the successful company would present Con­
gress with a fait accompli.
The stakes were high and it did not matter that the 
surveys were helter-skelter affairs. Accurate surveys took 
second place to finishing first. Whenever one crew lagged
behind its competitor, it simply dropped over onto the ad-
2 8versary's survey until the gap was closed.
As with the reclamation amendment, no Senator publicly 
opposed granting railroads right-of-ways through the North
2 7Letter, W. B. Rhodes to Theodore Roosevelt, Febru­
ary 11, 1909, U. S. Department of Interior, "Legislation 
Creating Glacier National Park," File No. 101, GNPA.
28Robinson, Through the Years, p. 35, For a descrip 
tion of the survey by a participant see, F. M. Shannon, 
"Recalls Milwaukee’s Rush to Beat G.N. to North Fork," 
Flathead Monitor, February 26, 1930, p. S.
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Fork even though it meant a railroad might cross to the
park side many times. Senator Heyburn, of Idaho, expressed
a consensus when he remarked:
We are making the west park line the middle 
of the [North Fork] river. I think we should 
recognize the rights of railroad companies ,
, . to construct . . . lines into those great
coal fields [in British Columbia] . . . and
we should have no element of uncertainty in 
this legislation. . . . Should any question 
arise between the executive departments and 
the railroad companies as to whether it was 
intended that only under circumstances of 
extreme necessity should they invade the 
park, then we would have this record of the 
[Congressional] proceedings . . .  to justify 
the contention that we intend to recognize 
the existing rights of the railroad compa­
nies . 29
Both local and Congressional opinion converged in the desire 
to protect potential railroad development.^^
In April 1910 the House of Representatives received for 
consideration the Senate version of the Glacier bill. With­
out debate. House amendments struck out the utilitarian pro-
31visions for timber, railroad and water development, A
2 9U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Heyburn speaking in 
favor of railroad amendment, 61st Cong,, 2d sess., 25 January 
1910, Congressional Record 45:959.
30The railroads filed their plats in May and June of
1909, but a new decision by the Secretary of the Interior 
held that no rights could be attached to the filings--before 
final approval by the Secretary. The matter was in the 
courts in 1910, U.S., Congress, Senate, Discussion of rail­
road right-of-ways within Glacier National Park, 61st Cong., 
2d sess., 9 February 1910, Congressional Record 45:1640,
^^U.S ,, Congress, House, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 13 April
1910, Congressional Record 45 : 4640-41,
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conference committee of both Houses then considered the
bill and quickly resolved the impasse in favor of utilitar-
3 2ian timber, railroad and water-storage provisions. New 
York Representative John Joseph Fitzgerald asked Representa­
tive Frank W. Mondell of Wyoming to explain the House’s 
hesitancy to insist upon its version of the bill. Mondell 
responded that the House managers had not been completely
informed, but after securing full informa­
tion in regard to the matter, the committee 
deemed it proper to recede. . . .^3
The railroad right-of-way and reclamation provisions re­
mained in the bill. With both Houses in agreement, the 
Glacier bill went to President Taft, who signed it into 
law on May 11, 1910.
Several factors coincided in 1910 to make possible the 
establishment of Glacier National Park. First, settlement 
was established firmly west of the Continental Divide, 
Citizens adjacent to the proposed park had the wherewithal
32U.S., Congress, Conference Committee of Senate and 
House, 61st Cong,, 2d sess., 26 April 1910, Congressional 
Record 45:5431.
.S ., Congress, House, Representative Fitzgerald ask­
ing for information on amendments to the Glacier Park bill, 
61st Cong,, 2d sess., 29 April 1910, Congressional Record 
45:557 0. There is no indication in the Great Northern 
Archives, located at the Minnesota Historical Society, St. 
Paul, Minnesota, that the Great Northern Railroad lobby 
attempted to convince members of the Senate-House Conference 
Committee of the importance they attached to granting rail­
road rights-of-way. See letter, Duane P. Swanson, Director, 
Great Northern Project Archives, dated 30 October 1975 to 
author.
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to demand concessions in the park bill. Residents in 
Kalispell and the North Fork Valley were especially suc­
cessful in seeking their more utilitarian desires. Through­
out the legislative process letters and petitions flooded 
Senator Carter's Washington, B.C. office demanding changes 
in his bills. The result was concessions to settlement, 
timber, mining, railroad and water use in the park.
The same was true of the Department of Agriculture. As 
noted earlier, Pinchot was determined that there should be 
no more national parks set aside which did not recognize the 
policy of natural resource development. The Chief Forester 
could not afford to undermine his political support in the 
West by an alliance with preservationists; hence Pinchot 
avoided embracing anything that smacked of 'locking up* 
forest resources. The Glacier National Park bill signed by 
President Taft in May 1910 must have pleased Pinchot very 
much.
The Great Northern Railroad also was interested in the 
new park but it had little interest in pure 'wilderness *. 
James J. Hill, manager of Great Northern, entertained a view
34Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 191; see also, 
letter from George Bird Grinnell to Madison Grant, Febru­
ary 28, 1908, Southwest Museum, Los Angeles, California, 
General Correspondence, 1908. Grinnell noted in the letter 
that "Pinchot, who is very familiar with the [Glacier] re­
gion, is enthusiastic for the [Park] bill;" and James B. 
Trefethen, Crusade for Wildlife (New York: Boone and Crockett 
Club, 1961), pp. 50-61.
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of conservation similar to Pinchot. Conservation, Hill 
intoned,
does not mean forbidding access to resources 
that could be made available for present use.
It means . . . the . . . largest development
. . . consistent with the public interest
and without waste,35
For Hill the *public interest* usually coincided with the
interests of his railroad. The new national park would be
a valuable asset for the Great Northern line but first it
would have to be developed with a system of roads, trails,
and comfortable hotels. Only then would Glacier * s scenic
grandeur attract large numbers of vacationers and boost Great
Northern * s passenger revenue.
Great Northern interest in Montana was not limited to 
Glacier National Park, however. East of Glacier Great 
Northern * s line spanned over four hundred miles of Montana's 
high plains. James Hill's railroad enthusiastically promoted 
settlement and farming in the region. By 1910 a trickle of 
homesteaders into Montana was turning into a flood. For 
example, between January 1 and April 15, 1910 Great Northern
35 Inter Lake, September 8, 1910, p. 1.
^^Sheire, Historic Resources Study, p. 177. There is a 
paucity of information on the Great Northern's role in setting 
aside Glacier National Park. The Great Northern Archives are 
currently closed to researchers. Professor Ralph W. Hidy, 
Isidor Straus Professor of Business History in the Graduate 
School of Business Administration at Harvard University, is 
currently working on a two-volume history of the Great North­
ern Railroad.
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hauled 1,100 carloads of equipment to eastern Montana for
? 7optimistic Honyockers. Emigrants snapped up thousands
of acres of land each month all along the Great Northern
3 8line east of the proposed park.
The key to success for sustained agriculture in that 
semi-arid region lay in reclamation projects to bring water 
to the parched soil. For decades Great Northern promo­
tional material extolled the value of the Rocky Mountain’s
39"never failing water supply for irrigation purposes."
A national park in the northern Rockies, which protected 
reclamation projects, promised to buttress diversified 
’public interest’ and the railroad’s future.
Preservationists had little difficulty in joining the 
railroad--farmer--irrigation coalition in support of national 
parks. In fact, the irrigation/preservation coalition had 
enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship in protecting both 
the nation’s watersheds and its s c e n e r y . P r e s e r v a t i o n i s t s  
easily added the watershed argument to their intellectual 
repertoire for park preservation. George Bird Grinnell’s
3 7The term ’Honyockers’ describes homesteaders in eastern 
Montana between 1910-1920. See, K. Ross Toole, Twentieth- 
Century Montana: A State of Extremes (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1972), p . 25.
^®Ibid., p. 59.
Pamphlet, Great Northern Railroad Company, "Irrigation
Projects in Montana Along the Great Northern Railway" (St. 
Paul: n.p., n.d.), p. 1.
^^Hays, Gosepl of Efficiency, pp. 21-22.
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article, "The Crown of the Continent," was fundamentally
a call to preserve the watershed of the St. Mary Lakes
region. The Eastern naturalist concluded:
The . . . region has a real value to this 
country, and this consists in its being a 
reservoir for the storage of the great 
amount of moisture precipitated there. For 
eight or nine months of the year this mois­
ture takes the form of snow, and supplies 
the annual waste caused by the melting of 
the glaciers. Without these glaciers and 
the far-reaching fields of snow which lie 
on the many mountains, the lakes and the 
rivers would soon go dry. At present all 
the watercourses are full at all seasons of 
the year, and the winter's snows, protected 
by dense pine forests, are still slowly 
melting in June and J u l y . 41
Grinnell's preservation rationale merged intimately with the
need to protect natural resources for man's use. Grinnell
was not opposed to tampering with nature for human benefits:
A plan is already on foot to divert the St.
Mary's [River] from its present course and 
turn it into Milk River. If this should be 
done it would render irrigable many hundreds 
of square miles in northern Montana which 
are now quite without value for lack of 
water. But if the forests of the . . . re­
gion should be swept away by fire or the ax, 
its value as a reservoir would be g o n e . 42
Though Grinnell opposed destructive forestry practices he
was enthusiastic about plans which contemplated utilizing the
Grinnell, "Crown of the Continent," p. 672. Grinnell*s 
closing comments echoed the National Irrigation Association's 
motto, "Save the Forests, Store the Floods, Make Homes on the 
Land." See, Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, p. 26.
42Grinnell, "Crown of the Continent," p. 672,
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area's watersheds for agricultural purposes. He did not 
protest, therefore, when Senator Dixon offered an amendment 
to protect the reclamation scheme.
In one sense, the passage of the Glacier bill with the 
water development schemes intact, represented the ambiguous 
nature of preservationist attitudes. In the past, preserva­
tion, irrigation, and travel interests agreed on leaving the 
watersheds untouched by man-made reservoirs. By 1910, how­
ever, major elements of the older coalition were unwilling 
to forego reservoir developments within the boundaries of 
proposed parks. Preservationists were slow to react to the 
changing situation, possibly because reclamation schemes 
seemed to be some of the most promising programs of the 
Progressive era.
Glacier National Park became the first national park 
to accommodate man-made water storage projects. Thus, four 
years before Ketch Hetchy received a green light from the 
Secretary of the Interior, Glacier National Park legisla­
tion established a precedent that would cause future misunder­
standing and further obscure preservationist principles in 
all national parks.
Two fundamental facts explain Congressional passage of 
the Glacier National Park bill. First, preservationists 
failed to see what future problems might arise if utilitarian 
principles were allowed free reign in the organic act. Sur-
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prisingly, they did not even attempt to restrict Secretary
Ballinger’s specific reclamation requests. Hence, the
reclamation amendment offered by Senator Dixon not only
protected tentative projects but expanded Reclamation’s
authority to the entire park.
Secondly, the Congressional debate on the Glacier Park
bill provides an interesting view of contemporary attitudes
toward national parks in general. Parks were seen as areas
of marginal worth. Senator Dixon described Glacier as
, . . an area of about 1,400 square miles of 
mountains piled on top of each other. There 
is no agricultural land whatever, except a 
little down in one valley on the west slope.
. . . Nothing is taken from anyone.
Dixon might have added that every major actor who demanded
a concession be written into the park bill received something
The premise that ’nothing be taken from anyone’ represented
the First Commandment in the Congressional discussion on
Glacier. Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania succinctly
summed up the Congressional attitude toward Glacier;
It is one of the grandest scenic sections in 
the United States, absolutely unfit for cul­
tivation or habitation, and as far as I know 
not possessing any mineral resources.
Penrose thus pronounced:
Congress, Senate, Senator Dixon speaking on the 
Glacier Park bill, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 9 February 1910, 
Congressional Record 45:1639.
^^U.S ., Congress, Senate, Senator Penrose speaking on 
Glacier Park bill, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 25 January 1910, 
Congressional Record 45:959.
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The section is admirably adapted for a 
[national] park.45
Finally, when frugal Texas Senator Joseph W, Bailey 
asked Joseph Dixon if the new park would require the govern­
ment to expend large sums of money in acquiring lands,
Dixon replied that it would n ot. "All of it is now in a 
forest reserve." Dixon triumphantly added, "there will 
not be a great deal of difference in its future status 
[than] from its p r e s e n t . D i x o n  was right. As consti­
tuted by the organic act, the new national park was little 
more than a "hybrid f o r e s t . P i n c h o t * s  multiple-use con­
cept of resource development was grafted successfully to a 
national park.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Dixon speaking on the 
Glacier Park bill, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 14 April 1910, Con- 
gressional Record 45:4669.
47 Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 175.
CHAPTER IV
'THE RAPE OF THE SHERBURNE*
There is no better way to destroy a park 
intended for beauty and use, such as Gla­
cier . . .  no way so absolutely success­
ful and so absolutely sure to be success­
ful as the granting of a right to . . .
do business within it. This precedent 
will come home to roost.
New Jersey Congressman Richard W. Parker 
speaking against amendments to the Mesa 
Verde National Park Bill - 1910.
Glacier's Organic Act was not a carte blanche for unre­
stricted resource development within the park. But neither 
did the Act set aside an area where nature was to remain 
forever free from man'^ tamperings. In each instance where 
Congress perceived the possibility of utilizing natural re­
sources, it took pains to protect posterity's right to develop 
them. The ambiguous and contradictory Glacier Park Act, with 
its emphasis on protecting both past and future development, 
led to inevitable conflicts between the desire to develop 
natural resources and the principle of preservation.^
^Obviously, it could be argued that even had Congress 
closed all utilitarian loopholes and firmly established the 
primacy of preservation within the Park, conflicts still 
would have arisen. The history of Yellowstone National Park, 
which has one of the least impaired organic acts, provides 
solid proof of such a contention. However, it is clear that 
vhere conflicts are inevitable, an act which clearly states 
the preservationist policy is preferable to one which recog­
nizes general exceptions to the preservation policy. In the 
absence of a clear policy, administrators, private interests, 
and the public are left without a scale on which to balance
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Conflicts appeared within a year of the park's establish­
ment. East of the Continental Divide, the reclamation and
timber provisions allowed the first large-scale utilization of
2Glacier's natural resources. The reclamation clause pro­
tected two specific Reclamation Service projects: the Blackfeet 
Project and the St, Mary Storage Unit of the Milk River Project. 
The Blackfeet Project was surveyed, recommended, and authorized 
prior to the establishment of Glacier National Park. It was a 
cooperative Bureau of Indian Affairs and Reclamation Service 
irrigation scheme to provide water storage and canal facilities 
for Blackfeet Reservation farmers.^ One section of this four- 
unit project directly affected Glacier National Park.^ The 
Lower Two Medicine Lakes Dam, built in 1912 on the Blackfeet 
Reservation, impounded approximately 13,800 acre feet of water ; 
the dam was rebuilt later 300 feet downstream and provided 
40,000 acre feet of storage. About one-third of the Lower Two 
Medicine Lake Reservoir lay on national park land.  ̂ The Glacier 
Park Act protected the Blackfeet Project.
preservation or development of resources within a national park.
^Utilitarian attempts and preservationist opposition to 
development of the Park's natural resources west of the Con­
tinental Divide will be the subject of chapter 5.
^Project Histories: Blackfeet Project. Montana, vol. 1, 
(Reel S), pp. 9-11; letter, George C. Shelhame to author,
April 6, 1976.
^The Piegan, Badger-Fisher, and Birch Creek units do not 
impound water within Glacier National Park.
^Two Medicine Dam was washed away in 1964. The Bureau 
of Reclamation rebuilt the dam. See, letter, George C.
Shelhame to author, April 6, 1976.
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The St. Mary Storage Unit of the Milk River Project 
differed in several significant respects from the Lower Two 
■Medicine Unit. First, the St. Mary Storage Unit was a 
headwater storage and diversion project to supplement the 
low summer flow of the Milk River.^ The headwater storage, 
diverted through a twenty-nine mile canal to the North Fork 
of Milk River, served to irrigate semi-arid Montana lands 
two to three hundred miles east of Glacier Park. The diver­
sion project required an international agreement with Great 
Britain to adjudicate water distribution for both the St. 
Mary and Milk Rivers. President Taft proclaimed the Bound­
ary Waters Treaty two days after he signed the act creating 
Glacier National Parkl^^ Between 1902 and 1910 survey and 
exploration work on the St, Mary Storage Unit was done to 
protect the United States claim to water appropriations on 
the St. Mary River while international negotiations contin-
oued. The St. Mary Storage Unit differed, therefore, from 
the Blackfeet Project in size, international scope, and in 
its being a diversion unit for farmers hundreds of miles 
removed from the Rockies. Also, the Unit differed in two 
other important aspects from the Blackfeet Project. First,
^Project Histories: Milk River Project, Montana; Project
History7~1902 to 1911, vol. 1 [Reel 76]. p. viii.
^Ibid,, no pagination. Boundary water negotiations were 
t carried on for many years prior to May 13, 1910. The Treaty 
was signed January 11, 1909.
^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 18 (Reel 82);
St. Mary Storage Unit History to January 1912, vol. 1, pp. 77-78
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the specific headwater storage plans changed significantly 
after May 1910. Secondly, the impact of the St. Mary proj­
ect on Glacier National Park was greater--both potentially 
and actually--than the developments initiated for the Black­
feet Indians.
Originally, Reclamation contemplated using Upper and 
Lower St. Mary Lakes for storage. The entire flow of Swift- 
current Creek was to be diverted into Lower St, Mary Lake to 
increase available water volume. To safeguard the plan, the 
Secretary of the Interior withdrew a belt of land extending 
one-half mile back from the margin of both lakes on Febru­
ary 28, 1903.  ̂ The 1910 reclamation provision in the Gla­
cier Park Act both protected and reaffirmed the 1903 with­
drawal .
When early investigations found bedrock too deep for a 
feasible dam site on the upper lake, attention shifted to 
Lower St. Mary Lake. Reclamation engineers investigated 
the possibility of constructing a forty-six foot dam on the 
lower lake that would pool both lakes together. Their plan 
included a dredging operation between the lakes so that 
Upper St. Mary Lake * s storage capacity could be drawn down 
to the level of Lower St. Mary Lake. This proposal pro­
vided 218,000 acre feet of storage in both lakes. It was
^Ibid., p . 30. 
^^Ibid,, p . 15.
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the Reclamation's water storage scheme at the time Congress 
passed the Glacier Park bill. Obviously, the 1910 plans 
for the St. Mary Storage Unit were preliminary and subject 
to considerable change. This fact best explains the gen­
eral language employed in the reclamation amendment to the 
Glacier Park bill. The Reclamation Service did not want to 
be held to a strictly defined construction plan for the St.
Mary Unit since their surveys and explorations were all ten­
tative ,
Reclamation Service activities after 1910 directly af­
fected Glacier National Park in several ways. The Supervis­
ing Engineer for the St. Mary Project, H. N. Savage, ex­
plained to Reclamation Service Director Frederick H. Newell 
that electrical power needed to run construction equipment 
for the St, Mary Canal could be obtained at "an unusually
good . , . damsite at the outlet" of Lake McDermott (Swift-
12current Lake), Savage recommended developing the site and
selling it to either the Great Northern Railroad or Glacier
13Park when no longer needed by the Reclamation Service.
Glacier Superintendent William R. Logan heartily en­
dorsed the Reclamation Service plan. In a letter to Clement S.
lllbid., p, 75.
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 20 (Reel 
83) : St. Mary Storage Unit History, 1912, vol. 3, pp. 104- 
110, citing letter, H. N1 Savage to Director of the Reclama­
tion Service, January 8, 1912.
55
Ucker, Interior's Chief Clerk in charge of the national 
parks, Logan explained that he hoped to have the hydro­
electric plant
made sufficiently large not only for . , . 
[Reclamation's] needs but [also] our needs, 
giving us the opportunity to sell consid­
erable power to hotels, etc., within a 
radius of twenty-five or thirty miles of 
McDermott F a l l s ,
Logan added that a transmission line built across the Conti­
nental Divide would allow electricity to be supplied also to 
the Park's west side. In short, Logan hoped to capitalize 
on the reclamation project, thus adding a money-making fa­
cility to augment park income.
Although the power transmission lines were not built, 
Reclamation did construct the hydroelectric plant at McDer­
mott Falls. The willingness of park officials to accommodate 
development of McDermott Fall's water potential illustrated 
their ambivalent attitude toward the principle of preserva­
tion and the failure of preservationist groups to keep a 
close surveillance on Glacier Park,
Superintendent Logan vacillated wildly in his attitudes 
toward preservation or development of Glacier's natural re­
sources. In the same letter to Ucker in which Logan lauded 
the hydroelectric potentials of McDermott Falls, he pleaded 
with the Chief Clerk not to support a Great Northern plan
^'^Letter, William R. Logan to C. S. Ucker, January 24, 
1912, U.S. Reclamation Service, File 660-05.4, GNPA,
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to dam McDermott Lake. Great Northern operated boat launches 
on both Lake McDermott and Josephine Lakes. A dam at the 
outlet of Lake McDermott could raise the lake’s level and 
facilitate a boat passage between both lakes. The vaca­
tioners would no longer have to walk a quarter of a mile 
between the lakes! Logan challenged the plan, insisting
This is not right and should not be per­
mitted, as it would have a tendency through 
the hand of man of spoiling the scenic 
beauty as created by the hand of God, and 
I would never recommend that the Great 
Northern, or any of the concessionaires be 
allowed to tamper in any way, shape or 
form, with the natural beauties of the 
park,15
Logan evidently saw no inconsistency in advocating on one 
hand the hydroelectric plan at McDermott Falls and on the 
other hand demurring to the Great Northern dam at the outlet 
of McDermott Lake. Perhaps the key to understanding Logan’s 
attitude lies in the fact that the latter plan involved 
large changes in the natural landscape and would be highly 
visible to park visitors.
The Reclamation Service had its own plans for McDermott 
Lake. In May 1912 the Board of Engineers recommended delay-
^ Îbid.
Steven T, Mather, appointed Director of the National 
Park Service in 1916, did not share Superintendent Logan’s 
scruples. Mather gave the Great Northern project enthusias­
tic support in the belief hotel patrons would be benefitted. 
But, because of a lack of funds and higher priorities else­
where, the project never advanced beyond the planning stage. 
See, Curtis Buchholtz, ’’The Historical Dichotomy of Use and 
Preservation in Glacier National Park” (Master’s thesis. 
University of Montana, 1969), p. 41.
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ing the pooling of the St. Mary Lakes "for several years
until the growing needs of irrigation [on the Milk River
17Project] require their [dams] construction." The Engi­
neers suggested a low dam at Lower St. Mary Lake to con­
trol water diversion into the St. Mary Canal and a thirty-
18foot dam on Lake McDermott for storage and flood control.
A reservoir on Lake McDermott would require the removal of 
recently constructed Great Northern buildings on the lake. 
The Board of Engineers noted that "these buildings in any 
event must be removed to permit development of Lake McDer­
mott as a reservoir for irrigation, but this need not be 
insisted on at the present season. . . . Reclamation
clearly felt it had priority.
In 1914, the Reclamation Service changed their plans 
for the St. Mary Storage Unit again. Engineers believed 
that more economical storage and flood control could be 
gained by construction of a dam at the outlet of Lower 
Sherburne Lake on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. The 
entire reservoir behind the proposed Sherburne dam was to
2 0be on Glacier National Park lands in the Sherburne Valley.
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 20 (Reel 
83) : St. Mary Storage Unit History, 1912, vol. 3, p p . 14 2- 
44, citing letter. Board of Engineers to Director of the 
Reclamation Service, May 28, 1912.
l^Ibid., pp. 142-43. 
l^Ibid., p. 144.
^Qproject Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 27 (Reel
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The engineers pointed out that if future demand required 
additional storage, a dam could be constructed at Red
21Eagle Lake. The Lower St. Mary dam might also be raised.
In accordance with the Board of Engineers recommendation,
the Director of the Reclamation Service approved the Sher-
2 2burne Dam in June 1914; construction began in July.
It took the Reclamation Service four years after the 
passage of the Glacier Park Act to decide on a definite 
plan for water storage in the St. Mary area. By 1914 Rec­
lamation envisioned a major reservoir in Glacier Park's 
Sherburne Valley, a small dam to divert Swiftcurrent Creek 
water into Lower St, Mary Lake and a low dam on St. Mary
86) : St. Mary Storage Unit: Sherburne Lake Reservoir Dam 
Feature History, 1914, vol. 10, p. 4, citing letter. Board 
of Engineers to Chief Engineer, May 29, 1914 ; and Sherburne 
Lakes Reservoir Dam Feature History. 1914. vol. 10, pp. 65- 
67. The Reclamation Service conducted the first rough to­
pographical surveys and investigations of the Sherburne 
Lakes between 1912 and 1913. See, Sherburne Lakes Reservoir 
Dam Feature History. 1914. vol. 10, p. 4. There were alter­
native water storage sites on the Milk River which some 
engineers felt should have been developed in lieu of the 
Sherburne Reservoir. Finally built in 1939, the Fresno Dam 
[Chain of Lakes Reservoir] was one such alternative. As 
late as 1928 an engineer expressed the opinion that " if he 
had had his way, the Sherburne Lakes storage would never 
have been built and the Chain of Lakes storage originally 
constructed in its stead," See Florence Kerr Facey, "Actual 
Construction of Fresno Dam Has Finally Started After 37 
Years," Progress Edition, The Havre Daily News, March 26, 
1937, pp. 18, 20, 25. Preservationists failed to exploit 
these differences.
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 29 (Reel 
^6): Stl^ Mary Storage Unit History, 1^15, vol. 12, pp. 305-7
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 27 (Reel 
^6) : St7 Mary Storage Unit : Sherburne Lake'~lTeservoir Dam 
Feature History. 1914. vol. 10, p. 4.
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River to control diversion of 850 cubic feet per second of 
water into the St, Mary Diversion Canal. When future need 
justified additional storage, plans called for utilization 
of park lands to satisfy the demands. Obviously, the Rec­
lamation Service took the water utilization clause in the 
Glacier National Park Act seriously. "Any area" of the park 
was available for Reclamation's appropriation.
National park officials did not object. Superintendent
Logan, as we have seen, encouraged Reclamation to expand its
plans where he thought the park might benefit financially.
Later, Acting Superintendent of Glacier, R. H, Chapman,
provisionally granted the Reclamation Service permission to
cut timber in the Red Eagle Valley for camp construction and
2 3reclamation facilities. Clement S. Ucker quickly confirmed 
the permit stipulating that the logging done in the park 
should follow standard U, S. Forest Service practices; pay­
ment to Glacier Park for cut timber was to be paid at pre­
vailing Forest Service rates. Reclamation crews cut 
900,570 board feet of timber in the Red Eagle Valley. The 
cutting lasted from May 1912 until January 8, 1913 when 
heavy snows halted logging operations.
Reclamation's logging venture was a fiasco. Cut timber 
had to be rafted four to five miles down Upper St. Mary Lake,
2 3Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 20 (Reel 
83): StT Mary Storage UrTit History, 1912, vol. 3, pp. 29-30, 
citing letter, Chapman to Reclamation Service, August 1, 1912
^^Ibid., citing letter C. S. Ucker to Reclamation Ser­
vice, August 10, 1912.
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through the one and three-quarters mile of creek between 
the upper and lower lakes, and then on to the sawmill at 
the edçe of Lower St. Mary Lake. Frequent rough, high 
waves on the upper lake and the narrow creek between lakes 
made the rafting operation difficult, dangerous and inef­
ficient. Only 151,560 board feet of the 900,570 cut from 
the Red Eagle Valley reached the sawmill in 1 9 1 2 . Raft­
ing attempts on the upper lake left thousands of board
o Afeet of timber scattered along the lake’s shore. In
steep terrain, "where it was impracticable to get . . .
[timber cut in 1912] out at a cost commensurate with the
cost of s[t]umpage plus cutting," logging crews left the
27down timber to rot.
Glacier Park and National Park Service officials also 
cooperated with the Reclamation Service project in the 
Sherburne Valley, Reclamation constructed a large gravel 
plant three and one-quarter miles above the Sherburne dam 
site within park boundaries in the summer of 1915. Crews 
processed and cleaned gravel at the plant and a tugboat
pushed barges of the gravel down Sherburne Lake to the dam
2 8construction site. Timber from Glacier National Park’s
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 24 (Reel
85] : St. Mary Storage Unit Feature History. 1914, vol. 7, 
pp. 198-201.
26jbid. , p . 198 .
27ibid., p . 205 .
^8project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 28 (Reel
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Sherburne Valley provided cheap fuel and constructions ma-
* 2 9terial for dam operations. In April 1918, National Park
Service Director Steven Mather authorized the Reclamation
Service to utilize fish from the Sherburne Lakes for camp
food supplies.
The first eight years of Glacier's existence thus wit­
nessed some attention to the principle of preservation, but 
in general, superintendents and park planners assumed pre­
servation would take care of itself. Park officials m a ­
terially aided many reclamation schemes but concentrated on 
their own projects. Hence, the period can be characterized 
as one of general development.^^ Road construction within
86) : St. Mary Storage Unit: Sherburne Lake Reservoir Dam 
Feature History, 1915, vol. 11, p. 34.
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, vol. 27 (Reel
86) ; St. Mary Storage Unit: Sherburne Lake Reservoir Dam 
Feature History, 1914, vol. 10, p. 47.
^^Project Histories: Milk River Project, 1918, vol. 13 
(Reel 80), p. ^62.
^^In 1911 William R. Logan, Superintendent of Glacier 
National Park placed an order for a sawmill and shingle 
machine to saw dead, down and insect infested timber into 
lumber and shingles. In his report to the Secretary of the 
Interior, Logan commented that "In many places the cutting 
of fully matured timber will not in the least mar the beauty 
of the park, but will benefit the growing timber. . . . Numer­
ous inquiries for lumber have been received, and in a short 
time it is believed lumber will rank first among the sources 
of income [for the Park]." See, Report of the Superintendent 
of Glacier National Park printed in Report of the Department 
of the Interior For the Fiscal Year Ending June 30 * 1911, 
vol. I (Washington, D .C .: Government Printing Office, 1912), 
p. 674.
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the park was planned and executed according to comprehen­
sive, not limited, objectives. Large hotels and chalets
sprang up in numerous locations throughout the park during
3 2this early period. Mather's attitude toward development 
was typical of national park thinking at the time. Mather 
hoped to
make park travel easier by promoting whole­
sale improvement in hotels, camps and other 
concessions and in roads and other trans­
portation facilities both inside the na­
tional parks and outside.33
Director Mather was continually buffeted between those 
who wanted to develop luxurious resorts and those who main­
tained the parks should be kept as primitive, and as close 
to their natural conditions, as possible. Mather’s attempts 
to tread between the two sides was a personal nightmare. 
According to Mather’s biographer, Robert Shankland, the Di­
rector ’’had no formula to fall back on, no scales for weigh­
ing out use against preservation.”^^ In fact, Mather leaned 
toward natural resource development either when it directly 
served park guests or when resource use could not be ob-
3 c:served directly by the public. The Glacier Park Act, with
^^Buchholtz, ’’Historical Dichotomy,” pp. 21-22.
3 3Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p." 56.
^^Shankland, Steve Mather, p. 101.
3 5Buchholtz,’’Historical Dichotomy,” p. 44.
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built-in utilitarian provisions allowing timber and water 
development, accentuated the dilemma. The Glacier Park 
Organic Act offered neither superintendents nor directors 
clear guidelines for developing park policies,
Mather's strategy was to establish solid public sup­
port for the national parks by increasing their popularity. 
In turn, he hoped public support would be reflected in 
expanding Congressional appropriations. Yet, despite gen­
eral enthusiasm for development, 1918 became a reminder to 
many park officials that resource developments endangered 
the preservation principle. In that year. Reclamation pre­
pared to close the gates of Sherburne Dam.
Belatedly, Mather became concerned with the effect of 
the reservoir on one of "Glaciers most celebrated valleys, . 
, In his 1918 report to the Secretary of the Interior
Mather drew attention to what he called "Serious Irrigation
37 38Problems" that would "impair the scenic beauty" of the
Sherburne Valley. Mather did not contemplate a battle to 
stop the flooding of the valley, but rather concentrated his 
efforts on having the flowage area cleaned of brush and tim­
ber prior to the flooding so that unsightly debris would not 
greet visitors as they traveled through the valley.
^^Reports of the Department of the Interior, 1918, 
vol. 1 ^Washington, D.C.: Government Printing uffice, 1919), 
p. 875.
37ibid.
Ibid,
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In 1919 the gates of the Sherburne dam were actually 
closed. Water stored behind the structure totaled 28,828 
acre feet by June. A sliding action in the dam's north 
abutment disrupted an overflow weir-type spillway thus 
preventing Reclamation from filling the reservoir to 
capacity. Yet, the small amount of water stored was enough 
to create, in Mather*s words, "a scene of havoc" in the 
Sherburne V a l l e y , M a t h e r ' s  reaction to the inundation was 
characteristic of his general attitude toward park preserva­
tion. He was not upset with the dam per se. What dismayed 
the Director, was the fact that timber and brush in the res­
ervoir had not been removed and therefore left an "unsightly" 
spectacle for park visitors.
The issue of Sherburne dam drifted lazily for another 
seven years. The Bureau of Reclamation continued to have 
difficulty with the Sherburne spillway. So long as it was 
inoperable the reservoir level remained low. During this 
period park officials tried to get brush and timber in the 
flowage area removed but could come to no agreement with 
Reclamation as to which government agency should pay for
% q Proiect Histories: Milk River Project, 1919, vol. 16 
(Reel 81), p. 34.
40Reports of the Department of the Interior. 1919, 
vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), 
p. 973.
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the c l e a n u p . I n  1926 the Sherburne issue received serious 
attention for the reservoir was to be filled to capacity in 
1927 .
Charles J. Kraebel, Superintendent of Glacier National 
Park since 1924, informed Director Mather of Reclamation *s 
schedule ; Park Saddle Company’s corrals would have to be 
removed from the flowage area. Kraebel, a government em­
ployee since 1911 and Assistant Superintendent of Forestry 
in the Territory of Hawaii prior to accepting the superin­
tendency at Glacier, held strong views about the impending 
Sherburne dam inundation. The issue of moving the Park 
Saddle Company corrals was of minor importance to Kraebel. 
The consequences of flooding the Sherburne Valley engaged 
his mind.
In September 1924, he prepared an eight-page article, 
complete with photographs of the valley before and after 
the limited inundations, entitled "The Rape of the Sher­
burne." Kraebel juxtaposed pictures taken in 1905 of the 
Sherburne Valley against photographs he took in 1924. He 
hoped the photographs would vividly demonstrate that even 
limited inundations destroyed the valley’s beauty,
Kraebel did not publish "The Rape of the Sherburne" 
material for two reasons, however. First the 1905 photo­
graphs of the valley were of poor quality. He realized
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that the contrast he hoped to demonstrate would not be ef­
fective. Secondly, Kraebel thought it "[un]seemly for a 
member of one government Bureau [the Park Service] to attack 
the procedure of another Bureau [Reclamation]. . . . 
Nevertheless, Kraebel confided his frustration in a memoran­
dum to Director Mather:
There is probably no question of the great 
need of additional water for the Milk River 
Irrigation Project and no question, there­
fore, of the high money value of the addi­
tional acre feet of water which will be 
obtained by filling Sherburne reservoir to 
its maximum capacity in the spring of 1927,
At the same time however, in the effort to 
reclaim the sagebrush prairies in the vi­
cinity of Malta [Montana] should the govern­
ment lose sight of the fact that it is de­
stroying the beauty of one of the principal 
valleys of Glacier National Park?44
Kraebel continued, striking a note not theretofore emphasized
in the Sherburne dam discussions:
Is it not rather shortsighted for the gov­
ernment to build with one hand and destroy 
with the other, particularly when the 
thing destroyed is something which nature 
has taken centuries to produce and which 
no government, however powerful, can ever 
replace?
Kraebel*s statement touched the cornerstones of preser-
^^Letter, 
National Park,
Charles J, Kraebel, Superintendent, Glacier 
to Steven T. Mather, Director, National Park 
ocxvice, reoruary 7, 1927, Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, 
GNPA. Probably is penned in on the typewritten copy.
^"^Letter, Charles J. Kraebel to Stephen Mather, 
February 9, 1927, Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.
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vationist principles. Something must remain 'untouched,* 
inviolate. "The preferable thing [to do] would be to pro­
hibit this flooding altogether," Kraebel told his superior, 
"but . . . that may appear too visionary and might, there­
fore, raise a storm of protest from the would-be farmers of 
the Milk River Project. . . . Nevertheless, Kraebel 
felt it his responsibility to point out the "wanton destruc 
tion"^^ of the reclamation project and to insist that the 
Park Service vigorously renew its efforts to convince Rec­
lamation to pay more attention to aesthetics at the Sher­
burne site.
Director Steven Tyn Mather was not a visionary. Ignor 
ing Kraebel* s suggestion that the Park Service move to pro­
hibit the flooding altogether, Mather tried to keep a lid 
on the affair. Mather preferred to lobby behind the 
scenes. In a letter to Reclamation Commissioner Elwood 
Mead, Mather requested
that before flooding any tree-covered land 
[in the Sherburne Valley], all tree growth 
and brush should be cut and burned. Such
Memorandum between Mather and park officials at 
Glacier National Park dealing with the Sherburne matter 
was sometimes marked Confidential or included instructions 
such as not for publication. S e e e . g . ,  letter, Mather to 
Acting Superintendent R. R. Vincent, March 10, 1927, Sher- 
burne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.
68
clearing should be complete and clean and 
should be carried to an elevation of a few .g 
feet above the ultimate high water contour.
Mather hoped Mead would hold off filling the reservoir until 
1928 so the cleanup could be accomplished.^^ Mather’s ef­
forts were unsuccessful. The Bureau of Reclamation closed 
the gates on Sherburne Dam in 1927; the reservoir filled to 
a full-pool capacity. The skeletons of bleached, white 
trees greeted Park visitors until removed by Civilian Con­
servation Corps workers in the late 1930s.
Reclamation developments on the Park’s east side were 
important for several reasons. First, reservoir construc­
tion was due, in part, to preservationist failure to con­
front a Congress debating the Glacier Park bill with the 
incompatibility of reclamation projects and the principle 
of preservation. It is clear from the Congressional de­
bates that had preservationists insisted on excluding utili­
tarian schemes from the bill, its passage would have been 
impossible. In this sense, preservationist unwillingness 
to fight ’a classic battle’ to exclude the east-side réclama 
tion projects can be understood as prudent strategy; a fight 
to exorcise water development schemes would have resulted in
48Letter, Steven Mather to Elwood Mead, 9 March 1927, 
Sherburne Reservoir, File L-54, GNPA.
'*®Ibid.
John Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 182.
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no national park. If such was the preservationist strategy 
it did not succeed. For the reclamation clause in the 
Glacier Park bill did not simply protect projects planned 
prior to the park’s creation. The Act extended the Bureau 
of Reclamation’s authority to ’’any area” within the park 
’’necessary for the development and maintenance of a govern­
ment reclamation project. . . .” Secretary Ballinger’s •
specific request grew, therefore, to an all inclusive amend­
ment without protest from preservationists.^^ This was a 
serious blunder since it opened the entire park to water 
development projects.
Secondly, park officials encouraged Reclamation to ex­
pand their utilization of the park’s water resources in the 
period prior to establishment of the National Park Service. 
Logan’s support of Reclamation activities at the McDermott
Secretary of Interior Ballinger’s attitude toward na­
tional parks was usually superior to many of his contempo­
raries. Ballinger opposed the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir, sup­
ported a national parks bureau in 1910, and wrote in favor of 
exempting the national parks from the provisions of the Right - 
of-Way Act of 1901. The broadening of the reclamation amend­
ment to include ’’any area” within Glacier National Park went 
far beyond both the spirit and intent of Ballinger’s specific 
request to Senator Nelson. See Hays, Gospel of Efficiency, 
p. 198 for a comparison between Ballinger*s and Gifforà Pin- 
chot’s attitude toward national parks; George Bird Grinnell*s 
magazine. Forest and Stream. called for the passage of the 
Glacier Park bill in several editorials. Even after the rec­
lamation amendment was appended to the bill, an editorial noted 
that ’’There can be no objection to the bill on any grounds, 
save possibly that of some supposed expense in connection with 
the maintenance of the park. . , .” See editorial. Forest and
Stream. March 5, 1910, p. 367. Ironically, on the same edi- 
torial page. Forest and Stream reiterated its opposition to a 
reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley.
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Falls hydroelectric plant smoothed the way for additional 
development. Park officials clearly placed resource de­
velopment and additional park revenue above the principle 
of preservation.
Director M a t h e r i n a b i l i t y  or unwillingness to protest 
the use of water resources within Glacier stemmed partly 
from his ambivalent attitude toward the use/preservation, 
dichotomy. More importantly, however, Mather was con­
cerned primarily with the task of protecting the political 
base of the National Park System itself. Horace Albright, 
who became National Park Service Director when Mather re­
tired in 1929, once remarked that "Mather had a shrewd po­
litical sense. He wouldn't get in trouble with Congress
5 2because he knew he needed their money and support." Po­
litical reality, then, imposed strict limits upon Mather's 
ability to defend strict preservationist policies within 
Glacier National Park. Had Mather strongly opposed the 
Sherburne project between 1916 and 1927, the 'storm of pro­
test' from Milk River farmers would surely have undermined 
Glacier's political support. In addition, Mather must have 
realized that the Glacier Park Organic Act dealt 'would-be 
farmers' most of the important trump cards. Under such 
conditions, Mather was unwilling to call anyone's bluff.
5 2Shankland, Steve Mather, p. 2 94.
CHAPTER V 
A VICTORY AT GLACIER VIEW
I am apprehensive that this [Glacier 
View Dam] issue is going to involve 
* the battle of the century* so far 
as we are concerned. We shall need 
all the help we can get.
Newton B. Drury, Director 
National Park Service
Conflicts over possible uses of the resources within 
Glacier National Park were not confined to the Sherburne 
Valley, West of the Continental Divide local interest 
groups who originally opposed a strictly preservationist 
Glacier Act continued efforts to restrict what remained 
of the preservationist writ.
In 1911, private land holdings within Glacier National 
Park totaled 16,580 acres; North Fork Valley homesteaders 
held the bulk of these private holdings.  ̂ Residents of the 
North Fork area, aided by the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce, 
circulated petitions in 1911 and 1912 that demanded reces­
sion of valuable North Fork lands from national park to 
private ownership. The petitions asserted that ten to 
twelve thousand acres of patented agricultural land and
^Buchholtz, "Historical Dichotomy," p. 33.
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thousands of acres of valuable timber were unjustly included
within park boundaries. Petitioners believed the lands thus
included within the park had "no particular scenic value"
and therefore should be opened immediately to further settle- 
2ment,
Superintendent William R. Logan's response to North 
Fork petitions was quick and forceful. In a letter to 
Frederick K. Vreeland, a member of the Camp Fire Club of 
America, Logan called attention to the efforts by "settlers 
and land promoters" to separate from the park "all the open 
land from [North Fork] river to the timber. . . . "  on the 
west slope of the Livingston Range. Logan explained to 
Vreeland that the area petitioners wanted withdrawn contained 
"the best portion of our grass country and game section,"
He urged Vreeland to use his influence with Congress and the 
Camp Fire Club membership to maintain North Fork lands within 
Glacier. Logan concluded his letter with a challenge to 
those who wanted to redraw the park's western boundary, "In­
stead of giving up any land there," Logan wrote to his friend, 
"I think we should take steps to obtain more land; in fact 
get rid of every settler on the north fork of Flathead 
River. . . . Logan's attitude represented standard na-
2"Efforts to Exclude the North Fork," Chronology File, 
1911, GNPA.
^Letter, William R. Logan to Frederick K. Vreeland, 
January 24, 1912, Re-opening Lands to Settlement, 1912, 
File 562, GNPA. ---- -------------------------
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tional park reaction to attempts by outside interests to 
exploit park resources. As the park custodian, Logan con­
sistently fought efforts to redraw Glacier’s boundaries 
for private gain. Officials in the Interior Department 
supported Logan’s position.^
North Fork settlers repeated their petition campaign 
in 1915. The new petitions concentrated on the isolation 
and depravation caused by exploitable North Fork resources 
being locked away inside Glacier. ’’It is practically im­
possible,” the petitioners declared, ”to transport farm 
products out of the valley . . . [and] this situation must 
continue until development is brought about by more settlers 
or other assistance.” The North Fork Valley was capable, 
in the opinion of settlers, ”of supporting a dense popula­
tion. . . . and we submit that it is more important to fur­
nish homes to a land-hungry people than to lock the land up 
as a rich m a n ’s playground which no one will use or ever 
use.” The settlers also reasserted their previous conten­
tion that the valley contained no glaciers or scenic attrac­
tion to justify park status.^
None of the early efforts to adjust Glacier's western
Letter, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Interior 
to Assistant Superintendent, Glacier National Park, H. W. 
Hutchings, February 23, 1912. Re-opening Lands to Settle- 
ment, 1912. File 562, GNPA.
Chronology File, 1915, Card #9, GNPA.
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boundary succeeded. While park officials wavered on other 
issues they did not contemplate acceding to pressures for 
boundary revisions. The inability of the valley to support 
agriculture, the continued failure to develop oil and coal 
potentials, and frequent destructive fires in the North 
Fork Valley accounted for most people drifting out of the 
area after 1919. Decreasing population contributed to lack 
of interest from railroads for building a line into the 
North Fork Valley.
Two other events further discouraged settlement and 
relieved pressures to exclude portions of the North Fork 
from the park. A special Congressional committee visited 
Glacier in 1925 to investigate the practice of private land 
holdings within the park. The committee reported unfavor­
ably toward agricultural holdings within Glacier. In 1929, 
Congress authorized gradual acquisition of private lands 
within the park^ and in 1931 repealed the railroad right -
7of-way provision originally granted in the Glacier Park Act.
^Buchholtz, "Historical Dichotomy," p. 59.
^Act of January 26, 1931 (46 U.S. Statutes at Large 1043), 
Surprisingly, there was neither Congressional nor local oppo- 
sition to repealing the railroad right-of-way provision in 
the Glacier Organic Act. The Depression and a generally nega­
tive attitude toward railroads during the 1930s probably ac­
counts for the lack of interest to extend lines into the 
North Fork. For the Congressional debates see, U.S., Con­
gress, Senate, Debate on an act to provide for uniform admin­
istration of the national parks by the U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 21 January 1931, Congressional 
Record 74:2793-2796. Local reaction to the January 26, 1931
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Henceforth, any railroad building through the North Fork 
Valley would have to construct its line totally west of 
the park. The period from 1910 to 1931, therefore, marked 
the end of liberal right-of-way grants and the beginning 
of a park policy ultimately aimed at acquiring all private 
land within the boundaries of Glacier National Park. One 
major resource utilization problem remained, however. The 
provision within the Park Act that allowed water resource 
developments.
As early as 1899 H. B. Ayres noted an abundance of 
potential water power development sites in the North Fork 
Valley. Ayres reported specifically that the tributary 
creeks to the North Fork River offered good water power 
potential. "Most of these [tributary creeks] flow through 
lakes which would afford excellent reservoirs. . . ," and
oa steady supply of water.
Several areas affecting the west half of Glacier Na­
tional Park were reserved for dam sites in the first two 
decades after Glacier's establishment. In 1915, Steven T, 
Mather, then Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, 
transmitted to Glacier Superintendent S. F. Ralston without
act was confined to an observation that private summer homes 
could no longer be constructed within the park. See, "No 
Further Permits for Homes Will Be Allowed For Glacier," 
Kalispell Times, January 29, 1931, p. 1.
oAyres, The Flathead Forest Reserve, p. 284.
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comment, a copy of an executive order withdrawing approxi­
mately forty acres of land in Glacier for potential water 
power development. The reserved area was on the North Fork 
River one mile above its junction with the Middle Fork of
9the Flathead River. Two more power site withdrawals were 
made on the North Fork River in the early 1920s. The first 
involved a small area near Canyon C r e e k ; t h e  second re­
served 3,685 acres--extending from five miles below Big 
Creek to two miles south of Polebridge and one-half mile 
back from the r i v e r . N o  map of the reserved area could 
be found but it probably involved only Flathead National 
Forest land on the west side of the North Fork River. The 
withdrawal is interesting, nevertheless, for several rea­
sons. An amendment to the Water Power Act of 1920, effec­
tive March 3, 1921, prohibited the Federal Power Commission 
from granting power licenses within the boundaries of any 
national park as then constituted. The February 13, 1922 
North Fork withdrawal antedated that amendment by nearly a
gLetter, Stephen T. Mather to S. F . Ralston, Novem­
ber 20, 1915. Power Sites Withdrawn, 1915, File 567, GNPA.
^^United States Forest Service, Possibilities for the 
Establishment of the Pulp and Paper Industry in the Flathead 
Region of Montana (Missoula, Montana: 192 0), p p . 9-10.
^^United States Forest Service, "Stage I, Impact Survey 
Report; An Analysis of the Interrelationship of the Glacier 
View Dam and Reservoir on the Resources and Management of 
the Flathead National Forest, Northern Rocky Mountain Re­
gion" [Missoula, Montana: March 1967), p. 4.
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full year. Since it would not be possible to use the Febru­
ary 1922 withdrawal without inundating portions of Glacier 
National Park the withdrawal would logically seem to have 
violated at least the spirit of the 1921 Water Power Act 
amendment. The power site withdrawal aimed ultimately at 
protecting water site development on the North Fork River 
if Glacier River boundaries could be adjusted at a future 
time.
In 1927 P. N. Bernard, Secretary of the Kalispell 
Chamber of Commerce, suggested just such a scheme to accommo­
date a water storage proposal by the Rocky Mountain Power
Company. Writing to National Park Director Mather, Bernard
stated :
It has been my understanding that the Park 
Service has been of the opinion that the 
west side of the park bordering on the 
North Fork and in the immediate vicinity
of the North Fork was not a valuable asset
to the Park, on account of the fact that 
it does not possess scenic beauty, and 
that there are a large number of settlers 
on the west side in an agricultural region 
that is not a Park Asset [sic]. . . .1^
Bernard admitted to some apprehension that his proposal might 
be considered a dangerous precedent by the National Park Ser­
vice, but that he
also apprehended that the demand today for 
storage is so great, and so necessary in 
this particular instance, that it would be
i2,,Efforts to Withdraw North Fork Land, 1927,” History 
Chronology File. 1927, GNPA.
78
reasonable upon the part of the Park Ser­
vice to grant, or favor, the passage of a 
bill providing for such storage and the 
elimination of the North Fork canyon from 
the park area.13
Mather *s reply was unequivocal. He strongly opposed 
withdrawing any park land for commercial p u r p o s e s . G l a ­
cier * 5 North Fork Valley benefitted from National Park Ser­
vice efforts to protect Yellowstone National Park from dam 
developments in the early 1920s. Speaking against dams 
there, Mather asked:
Is there not some place in this great nation of 
ours where lakes can be preserved in their 
natural state ; where we and all generations 
to follow us can enjoy the beauty and charm 
of mountain waters in the midst of primeval 
forests?!^
Mather's evolving distaste for artificial reservoirs in 
national parks strengthened his opposition to dams on 
Glacier Park's west side.
No further efforts were made during the 1920s to de­
velop the North Fork's water resources. Events occurred 
during the 1930s, however, that attested to continued in­
terest in water development on the park's west flank.
E. W. Kraemer, working for the United States Forest Service, 
listed potential water power sites on the North Fork in a
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
Quoted in Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 309.
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1931 r e p o r t . The United States Geological Survey conducted 
a similar survey in 1935. The U.S.G.S. Director, in a reply 
to an inquiry from the National Park Service, stated that 
the only sites being seriously considered for future develop­
ment were on Flathead Lake and on the South Fork of the Flat­
head River, He further stated that there was "no reason for
alarm as to any reservoir construction that could affect
17Glacier National Park in any way.” A Northwest Pacific
Planning Commission report listed a potential reservoir site
on the North Fork River at the base of Glacier View Mountain
18in 1939, despite U.S.G.S. assurances. Recognition of the 
Glacier View site in the late 1930s set the stage for con­
certed efforts to develop it in the 1940s.
The governmental agency most likely to have been in­
terested in developing the Glacier View Dam site prior to 
World War II was the Bureau of Reclamation. But the exi­
gencies of global war altered the situation. Three weeks
E, W. Kraemer, "Water Power in Montana," January 28, 
1931 manuscript report to the U.S.F.S., cited in C. E. Erd­
mann , Geology of Dam Sites on the Upper Tributaries of the 
Columbia River Basin in Idaho and Montana: Part 3. Miscel­
laneous Dam Sites on the Flathead River Upstream from 
Columbia Falls. Montana: Water Supply Paner 866-C (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 119.
^^"Chronological Summary," Glacier View Dam I , GNPA. 
The Glacier View Dam files consist of four parts. Parts 
1 and 2 are in chronological order, 1943-1949. Parts 3 and 
4 are mixed up. All memorandum in the files consist of 
copies.
^®Ibid.
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after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States
19faced a critical electrical power shortage.
The situation in the Pacific Northwest was particularly 
crucial. The plutonium plant at Hanford, Washington^and 
Pacific Northwest aluminum plants--which provided material 
for aircraft construction--required enormous amounts of 
electrical energy to supply material for the war. In June 
1943, Brigadier General Warren T. Hannum and Colonel Richard 
Park of the United States Army, Corps of Engineers, held 
public hearings at Kalispell to present plans for augmenting
by three million acre feet the supply of water available up-
2 0stream from Grand Coulee and Bonneville dams. Wartime
shortages of construction material precluded anything more
than enlarging an existing structure. Therefore, the Corps
proposed to add seventeen feet to the height of Kerr Dam to
21secure extra storage. According to Brigadier General 
Hannum, the proposal to raise Kerr dam was "the only solu­
tion to the problem of supplying power needed by the end of
Philip J. Funigiello, "Kilowatts for Defense: The
New Deal and the Coming of the Second World War," The 
Journal of American History, 56 (December 1969): 6191
2 0Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L. C. Merriam, June 12, 
1943, Glacier View Dam I, GNPA.
21Montana Power Company leased the Kerr Dam facility. 
Under the Corps* proposal the dam would be appropriated 
from Montana Power under authority of the Second War Powers 
Act. See, Missoulian, June 2, 1943, p. 8.
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2 21944 for war production in the Pacific Northwest." The 
Corps* plan called for an additional seventeen feet at a 
later time, to increase the reservoir capacity behind Kerr 
Dam by another three million acre feet.
The Corps of Engineers* plans would have flooded the 
town of Kalispell (population 9,7 00) and several small com­
munities in the Flathead Lake area. Residents objected 
vigorously. Shops in Kalispell closed for the Army hearings 
and hotels filled to capacity with Flathead area people who
wanted to express personally their dissatisfaction with the
2 3Corps' proposal. Citizens packed the Kalispell auditorium, 
where the hearings were held, beyond its three thousand per­
son capacity; loudspeakers carried the proceedings to throngs 
of people o u t s i d e . L e s s  than a week later, the Corps 
announced that the plan to raise Flathead Lake was officially 
"dead".^^
Glacier National Park officials watched apprehensively 
the political skirmish between Flathead residents and the 
Corps. Their initial interest stemmed from the fact that 
the Corps* plan to raise Flathead Lake to 2927 feet above 
mean sea level would flood parts of the Glacier National Park
2 2Quoted in Mis soulian, June 3, 1943, p. 1. 
^^Ibid,, p. 1.
^̂ Ibid.
2 5Missoulian. June 9, 1943, p. 1.
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Fish Hatchery at Creston. But more importantly, Flathead 
area residents insisted that less destructive alternative 
power storage sites existed in the Flathead's upper tribu­
taries. Specifically, they pointed to three potential 
sites: Hungry Horse, Bad Rock Canyon and Glacier View.
The Flathead Citizens Committee, hastily organized in 1943 
to thwart changes in Flathead Lake's level, quickly pro­
duced a report which expanded the rationale for developing 
water resources above Flathead Lake. According to the Com­
mittee report, upstream development would enhance irrigation 
and provide cheap electrical power for expanding the region's 
lumber industry. The Committee positively supported water 
resource development, but not on Flathead Lake. The Com­
mittee's report concluded that the Hungry Horse and Glacier 
View Dams "should be developed . . .  at the earliest pos­
sible date.
The Flathead Citizens Committee was not alone in its 
assessment regarding Flathead Lake and the upper tributaries. 
The Montana County Commissioners, meeting for their Annual 
Convention at Great Falls in July 1943, endorsed a resolution
2 f\Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L, C, Merriam, June 12, 
1943. Glacier View Dam I , GNPA.
27Report and Justification for Development of Water 
Resources Above Flathead Lake and the Relation to Irrigation, 
hlood Control, Power, and Navigation, prepared for Flathead 
County Citizens Committee, by the Flathead Valley Planning 
Committee, August 26, 1943, p. 18.
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that listed the detrimental effects of raising Flathead
Lake. The resolution concluded that the Corps project
2 A"would seriously damage the entire Flathead Valley."
The assembled Commissioners asked authorities to investi­
gate the upper tributaries of the Flathead River where 
lands were uninhabited and already under government owner­
ship. Dams could be built there, "without serious damage
.•29to anyone. . . .
The response of the Park Service to these early sug­
gestions was cautious. Park officials appreciated the diffi­
cult problems faced by Flathead area people in protecting 
their communities. Glacier Superintendent Donald S. Libbey 
outlined the predicament for his regional director. Libbey 
believed that the shortage of critical materials during the 
war would make construction of a dam at Glacier View or 
elsewhere unlikely, if not impossible. He warned that in 
the long run the site at Glacier View would be given serious 
attention by water development agencies. He recommended 
careful study of all aspects of the problem. In a curious 
conclusion to his memorandum Libbey noted: "Actually,
there are some advantages as well as disadvantages to Gla­
cier National Park which should be weighed in the balance.
. . ." when considering the Glacier View dam p r o p o s a l . T h e
^^Great Falls Tribune, July 6, 1943, p. 1.
29jbid.
^^Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to L. C. Merriam, June 30,
1943. Glacier View Dam I, GNPA.
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position of the Park Service to dams on Glacier’s west side 
obviously had not yet gelled by 1943.
The war caused Park Service ambivalence. Two thousand- 
four hundred wartime permits allowing military use of areas 
or facilities within the National Park Service system were 
issued during World War Two. Forts Pulaski and Cabrillon, 
both national monuments, closed during the war to allow 
utilization of the land for study of military tactics, 
maneuvers, and bivouacking of troops. Death Valley National 
Monument was opened to the mining of salts and Yosemite 
National Park was exploited for a small amount of tungsten. 
Numerous suggestions were made during the war that cannons, 
markers, and monuments in the national military parks be 
melted down and contributed to scrap metal drives. The 
N.P.S, successfully resisted most of these suggestions, 
although Swiss bells placed on several of Glacier National 
Park’s highest passes did go to the junkman.
Two events in 1942 at the park underscored the feeble 
position of the National Park Service during the war. Super­
intendent Libbey reported in March 1942 that the U. S. Army 
was contemplating interning Japanese enemy aliens at aban­
doned CGC camps at McDonald Creek and Apgar Flats near Lake
31 Park Conservation: A Report on Park and Outdoor Recrea 
tion Resources in the United States for the Secretary ot the 
Interior, prepared by the National Park Service [Chicago, 
Illinois: January 28, 1946), pp. 43-46.
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3 2McDonald. Acting Region Four Director Herbert Maier
noted the difficulty of the Army's plans:
. . . this [Japanese] alien matter is a 
very serious one at this time from the 
standpoint of the federal authorities, 
since it pertains directly to the war ef­
fort. The Service is not in a particu­
larly strong position to interpose objec­
tions . especially since tourist travel to 
the Park is likely to be very low this 
summer, and since both McDonald and Apgar 
Flats are not centers of tourist concen­tration. 33
The National Park Service could not openly discuss this 
topic with anyone. Secrecy prevented raising questions or 
obtaining much information.
Luckily, the Park Service heard nothing more of the 
scheme after March 1942. But one further incident empha­
sized the *weak position* of the Service in dealing with 
military use of the park. A group of Army officers visited 
Glacier in August 1942 on a preliminary reconnaissance to 
establish the feasibility of constructing a seventeen 
thousand man cantonment for snow survival training, mountain 
climbing techniques, skiing, and mountain maneuvers. The
32Confidential Memorandum, D. S. Libbey to Owen A. 
Tomlinson, March 4, 1942. Use of National Park Areas by 
the Military Services. File 601-04 (L1419); see also Secret 
Memorandum, quoted in Confidential Memorandum, T. K. Wolfe, 
Liaison Officer, CCC, to 0, A. Tomlinson, March 3, 1942,
Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services, File5ur-04 (L1419).------------ --- ---------------
33Confidential Memorandum, Herbert Maier, to D. S. 
Libbey, March 5, 1942. Use of National Park Areas by the 
Military Services. Emphasis mine.
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survey party investigated Apgar Flats which lies between 
park headquarters and Lake McDonald. The Army offered to 
adjust any damages done to the park landscape by acquiring 
all the private land holdings on the lower end of Lake 
McDonald-- turning all of it over to the National Park Ser­
vice after the war. Reporting these facts to National Park 
Service Director Newton B. Drury, Libbey suggested that the 
destruction to park features could be kept to a minimum by 
restricting the training area to the Apgar Mountains west 
and southwest of Lake McDonald. Confined to that area, 
possible damages "would not destroy a scenic portion of 
the Park which is now, or in the future would be, of pri­
mary importance from a scenic viewpoint. Director Drury 
told Libbey to direct the officers to areas outside the 
park.
The military’s war-related requests to utilize parts 
of Glacier National Park can be characterized generally as 
probes and investigations. In each instance, the National 
Park Service essentially remained in the dark, uneasy about 
what the military might suggest next, and trying desperately 
to formulate positive alternatives to military requests. 
Compounding the problem was the fact that National Park 
Service offices had been moved out of Washington, D.C., and
^^Memorandum, D . S. Libbey to Newton B. Drury, August 7, 
1942. Use of National Park Areas by the Military Services, 
File 601-04 (L1419) .
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relocated in Chicago for the duration of the war to make 
room for * essential* war-related bureaus. This further 
weakened the Park Service ability to communicate with
Washington officials sympathetic with their responsibili-
3 5ties. The secrecy surrounding Army proceedings on these 
early matters was typical of what came later when the Corps 
of Engineers sent field representatives to Glacier to inves­
tigate potential dam sites.
While the war continued, the Park Service had little 
choice other than to cooperate with the Army. When Secre­
tary of War Henry Stimson requested permission from Secre­
tary of the Interior Harold Ickes to conduct field surveys 
and exploratory borings at the Glacier View and Fool Hen 
reservoir sites on the North Fork River, Ickes granted the 
Corps authority. The Park Service exacted a commitment from 
the District Corps of Engineers officer in Seattle not to do 
any irreparable damage to the park landscape and to clean up 
the test areas to the satisfaction of Glacier’s superinten­
dent .
Secretary Ickes, with enthusiastic support from the Na­
tional Park Service, attempted to terminate Corps explorations
Elmo Richardson, Dams. Parks and Politics: Resource 
Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era 
(Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 
p. 11.
^^Letter, Abe Portas to Secretary of War, August 16,
1944. Reservoir Sites, File 601-05, part 1, GNPA,
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in Glacier as soon as the war ended. Newly appointed Sec­
retary of War Robert P. Patterson* s August 22, 1945, re­
quest for additional Corps explorations at a new site on 
the North Fork gave Secretary Ickes and the National Park 
Service an opportunity to test their strength. Ickes sent 
Under Secretary Abe Portas a special memorandum:
I think that we ought to go pretty slow 
about giving the Army Engineers the right 
to bore in any of our national parks . . .
I will have to be convinced of the neces­
sity and the reasonableness of makingthese borings.37
Encouraged by Secretary Ickes * concern and cautious 
position, Newton B. Drury, Director of the National Park 
Service since 1940, seized the opportunity to present Ickes 
with a comprehensive overview of water development-related 
threats to the National Park system. "I have been gravely 
concerned for some time," Drury confided to the Secretary, 
"about the expanding dam construction programs of the Corps 
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation as I feel that 
they constitute a serious threat to the preservation of the
National Park System. . . .*' Drury admitted that the Na­
tional Park Service gained some benefits through cooperation 
with these agencies but emphasized that it was "becoming
more difficult to withstand pressure for the construction
3 8of water projects in areas of the National Park System."
^^Special Memorandum, Harold Ickes to Abe Portas, Sep­
tember 10, 194 5. Reservoir Sites.
^^Memorandum, Newton Drury to Harold Ickes, September 26,
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Director Drury had a particular reason for accentuat­
ing the Bureau of Reclamation in his memorandum to Secre­
tary Ickes. The Bureau of Reclamation's River Basin Re­
ports, soon to be released, tentatively listed proposed 
projects that would encroach upon two national parks and 
several national monuments. These published reports, in 
Drury's opinion, increased pressure on the Park Service . 
to compromise the boundaries of the national parks. Fur­
thermore, Drury argued that the inclusion of tentative 
projects by the Bureau of Reclamation in their reports 
placed the Service in the uncomfortable position of seeming 
to oppose "worthwhile water conservation projects," even 
though many of the projects might "never be needed or could 
be constructed elsewhere. Drury felt that a judicious 
amount of heat applied to the Bureau of Reclamation by the 
Secretary would protect the Park Service’s position within 
the Interior Department.
The National Park Service Director’s immediate problem, 
however, was not the Bureau of Reclamation, but the Corps of 
Army Engineers. Their request for additional authorization 
for test bores near Canyon Creek was still pending in Secre­
tary Ickes’ office. The National Park Service staff drafted 
a reply to the request for Ickes’ signature. Ickes wanted
1945. Reservoir Sites. Emphasis mine, 
^®Ibid.
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to deny permission for further drilling in Glacier National 
Park, stating that the "Corps of Army Engineers is just as 
regardful of scenery and recreation as a swarm of locust 
is for vegetation. The draft denying permission ex­
plained the rationale:
The exigencies of war and certain emergency 
legislation to facilitate its successful 
prosecution justified limited relaxation 
of . . . the . . . long-time policies for
the conservation of our national parks and 
monuments. That situation, however, no 
longer exists. In the circumstances, I
[Ickes] must refuse to permit further en­
croachment upon the national parks, except 
in those instances specifically authorized 
by the Congress.41
The Archilles Heel of both Secretary Ickes' and Direc­
tor Drury's desire to protect Glacier National Park from 
encroachment was contained in the last clause of the draft: 
'except in those instances specifically authorized by the 
Congress.' Interior Department Solicitor, Warner W. Gard­
ner, asked to comment upon the legal basis for denying per­
mission, professed substantial misgivings. Gardner advised
the Secretary and Director Drury that he believed the Corps 
possessed adequate legal authority to carry out surveys at 
Glacier under provisions of a Congressional act of June 28,
^^Memorandum, Harold Ickes to Newton Drury, October 15,
1945. Reservoir Sites.
^^Draft letter (never signed), Harold Ickes to Secre­
tary of War, Robert P. Patterson, September 26, 1945. 
Reservoir Sites.
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1938 directing the Secretary of War to survey the Flathead 
River and tributaries for flood control purposes. The 
Upper Canyon Creek area came within the orbit of this con­
gressional directive. It was "probable," Gardner advised, 
"that the Corps of Engineers, if it were sufficiently bold, 
could make these surveys whether or not it had permission 
of the Department [of the Interior]. The Solicitor sug­
gested granting permission in order to maintain administra­
tive control and supervision over the Army surveys at Gla­
cier, Park Service officials continued to feel that per­
mission should be denied despite Gardner's legal reasoning. 
However, Ickes acquiesced to Gardner's logic but insisted 
Gardner make the letter granting permission to the Corps 
"a stiff one."
Unable to halt Corps surveys, Drury again tried to 
have references to reservoir sites affecting Glacier Na­
tional Park deleted from the Bureau of Reclamation's Columbia 
Basin Reports. In a letter to Secretary Ickes, the National 
Park Service Director noted that "we will not be in a good 
position to withstand pressure from Corps of Engineers' 
projects in the parks if we include similar reservoir pro­
posals in the Departmental reports. To include tentative
^^Memorandum, Warner W, Gardner to Harold Ickes, Decem­
ber 5, 1945, Glacier View Dam I ,
43 Ibid.; pennote from Ickes to Gardner on Gardner's 
letter.
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projects, such as the one for Glacier View, would only
aggravate the situation. The Bureau steadfastly objected
to deleting potential reservoir sites on the North Fork
River. Their February 1947 report included the following
reference to the Glacier View site:
. . . a reservoir site at the Glacier View 
site would probably have less effect upon 
Glacier National Park than alternative 
storage possibilities on the upper Flathead 
River, where storage may be required ulti­
mately for full use of water resources of 
the [Columbia] basin. . . .
"The value of such storage," the report admitted, "must be
carefully weighed from an economic standpoint against the
park values lost to determine the feasibility of this
proj ect.
Two things, then, were clear to National Park Service 
officials by early 1947. First, the contradictory nature of 
several Congressional acts negated the possibility of pro­
tecting Glacier from encroachment by the U.S. Army, Corps of 
Engineers. While the National Park Service wanted desper­
ately to carry out its responsibility to preserve the park’s
Memorandum, Newton Drury to Harold Ickes (Through the 
Water Resources Council), February 7, 1946, Glacier View 
Dam I.
^^United States Department of the Interior, The Columbia 
River; A Comprehensive Report on the Development of the Water 
Resources of the Columbia River Basin for Irrigation. Power 
Production, and other Beneficial Uses in Idaho, Montana,
Nevada. Oregon. Utah. Washington, and Wyoming (Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing Office, February 1947), vol. 1, p . 201
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natural environment, the Corps of Engineers was equally 
responsible to the Congress for compiling comprehensive 
reports on the Columbia River Basin, Secondly, the con­
tradictory nature of the Department of the Interior, of 
which the National Park Service was but a small part, 
augured against a solid Interior Department consensus for 
preservation. In fact, the Bureau of Reclamation, which 
remained in Washington during the war, continued to expand 
its programs and congressional support for water develop­
ment s c h e m e s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  by the time National Park 
Service national headquarters were re-established in Wash­
ington in 1946, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, generally 
a strong National Park Service supporter, had resigned.
The Park Service’s position within the Interior Department 
was weakened by these developments and the general post­
war desire for unrestricted resource development.
Hemmed in by conflicting departmental interests within 
Interior, Drury decided that it was time to tap the major 
source of Park Service political support outside the gov­
ernment. Drury sent a short mimeographed circular on pro­
posed dams in Glacier to over forty conservationist organi­
zations in May 1947. The organizations on Drury’s list 
were primarily preservationist in emphasis --as opposed to 
a 'wise use’ conservationist orientation. The circular
46Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics, p. 59.
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briefly explained the effect of possible dams on Glacier 
National Park, Attached to the circular was an address 
for individuals wanting to write to the Corps of Engineers. 
The N.P.S. Region Two office provided detailed information 
on proposed dams to the organizations later in the same 
month. The memorandum noted that the proposed dam at the 
Glacier View site would be four hundred feet high and imy 
pound about three million acre feet of water in a twenty- 
eight mile long reservoir. Twenty-one thousand, five 
hundred acres of Glacier National Park would be inundated 
by the development and the fall and winter drawdown of the 
reservoir would average between 125 to 140 feet. The 
Region Two statement summarized the detrimental effects of 
Glacier View dam on the park:
Construction of the Glacier View Dam 
would seriously impair the primitive char­
acter of the North Fork section of the park 
by creation of a fluctuating artificial 
body of water. This area contains forests 
of exceptional beauty ; its wilderness 
character is one of the most highly prized 
features of the park. Also, it would be 
extremely detrimental in its effect on 
wildlife, particularly the larger animals.
The area that would be submerged would 
encompass practically all of the winter 
range of moose and white-tailed deer in 
the northwestern part of the park as well 
as materially reduce the range for many 
other species. In 1945 it was estimated 
that 70% of the winter range for 450 
white-tailed deer, 20% of the winter 
range for 550 mule deer and elk, 80 to
47 .Statement, Drury to conservationist organizations,
May 14, 1947. Glacier View Dam I .
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90% of the winter range of 100 moose, and 
70% of the beaver colony population of 130 
would be eliminated as a result of con­
structing the dam.48
The reservoir would flood, in addition, two ranger stations, 
the North Fork roads on both sides of the river, and raise 
the level of Logging Lake by fifty feet. The Park Service's 
assessment of Glacier View's effects on the park and park 
wildlife provided preservationists essential background in­
formation necessary to organize stiff opposition to the dam 
should the Army Corps of Engineers decide seriously to pro­
mote the project.
It had become clear, by January 1948, that the Corps' 
forthcoming review reports of proposed dam and reservoir
sites in the Columbia Basin would emphasize and recommend
4 9for approval the Glacier View site. The National Park 
Service asked the Secretary of Interior, Julius Krug, to 
intervene directly in the Glacier View matter with the Sec­
retary of War when Seattle District Engineer, Colonel L. H. 
Hewitt, informed the Service that the schedule for comple­
tion of the Columbia River Review Report had been accelerated 
to meet a completion date of Spring 1948.^^ The Service
48Memorandum, Water Control Projects in Relation to Gla­
cier National Park, May 29, 1947. Glacier View Dam I.
^^Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to 0. A. Tomlinson, Jan­
uary 20, 1948, Glacier View Dam I ; Memorandum, Herbert Maier 
to Newton Drury, January 26, 1948, Glacier View Dam I;
Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to Herbert Maier, January 28, 
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
^^Memorandum, Herbert Maier to Newton Drury, January 26,
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prepared a letter for Secretary Krug’s signature which 
emphasized the primitive nature of the North Fork region 
and the Park Service’s obligation to maintain it in a 
"natural state for the use and enjoyment of . . . this and 
future generations,"^^ The letter to Army Secretary 
Kenneth C. Royall asked for deletion of the Glacier View 
site from the Corps’ reports. However, several agencies 
within Interior objected to the draft letter. Walton Sey­
mour, Director of the Office of Power, recommended that 
National Park Service objections be first "presented at the 
regional level . . . and that any communications from the
[Interior] Secretary be deferred until the [Interior] De­
partment has been called upon officially to present its com
5 2ments on a definite report of the Corps of Engineers."
In short, Seymour insisted the National Park Service stay 
within established procedural channels and not short- 
circuit the process by directly appealing to the Secretary. 
Drury's response to Seymour’s comments was curt. At the 
bottom of Seymour’s letter Drury penned:
1948, Glacier View Dam I ; Letter, Colonel L. H. Hewitt to 
Herbert Maier, January 28, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
^^Draft letter. Secretary of the Interior Krug to Sec­
retary of War, Kenneth Royall, March 17, 1948, Glacier View 
Dam I.
5 2Memorandum, Walton Seymour to Newton Drury, March 30,
1948, Glacier View Dam I,
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Mr. Seymour:
Sorry, but I do not believe the letter 
should be further delayed.
N.B.D.
3 - 30-48
The proposed letter, drafted by the National Park Ser­
vice, never reached Secretary Krug *s office despite Drury's 
repeated insistence. Drury's staff redrafted the letter 
several times to meet objections but it was held in the 
office of an interested agency for over a week without hav­
ing been signed. The delay was sufficiently long to con­
vince Drury that he would have to delay urging Secretary 
Krug's intervention until after he saw the kind of treat­
ment Army reports would accord the National Park Service 
position on Glacier View dam. National Park Service 
officials, stopped again by forces within Interior, decided 
to concentrate on preparing for Corps of Engineers hearings 
on the Glacier View proposal scheduled for Kalispell in May.
The Service also began enlisting support from major national
. 54conservation organizations.
The notice of public hearings sent by the Corps to 
interested parties stressed both the legal authority for 
conducting the Kalispell hearings and the multi-purpose
53Memorandum, Newton Drury to L. C. Merriam and 0. A. 
Tomlinson, April 23, 1948, Glacier View Dam I .
^^Memorandum, Drury to conservationist organizations,
May 4, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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aspects of the Glacier View dam proposals. According to 
the notice, the Glacier View proposal contemplated "head­
water storage regulation for flood control, navigation, 
and hydroelectric production. Glacier View dam, in 
conjunction with other projects, would control completely 
the floods that cause damage in
the vicinity of Kalispell and at other points 
along the Flathead River, and assist in the 
control of damaging floods throughout the 
Columbia system downstream . . . .  the proj­
ect would [also] provide abundant and eco­
nomical power throughout the year locally, 
and assist in relieving a critical power 
shortage which now is hampering the economic 
development of the entire region.56
Recreation and soil conservation measures were also listed
as valuable components of the plan.
The issue of dams on Glacier's western boundary became 
an open public debate in May 1948, The Army hearings, and 
later hearings in Spokane by the Board of Engineers for 
Rivers and Harbors, provided an extended opportunity to 
clarify conflicting attitudes toward the future status of 
Glacier's North Fork area.
Preservationists focused attention on several issues 
during the period of open debate. At the outset, they 
attempted to lay to rest the clause in the Glacier Park Act
Notice of Public Hearing, Issued by Department of the 
Army, Corps of Engineers, Seattle District Engineer, April 27, 
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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allowing Reclamation the right to use park areas for flow- 
age purposes. Horace Albright, director of the National 
Park Service from 1929 to 1933, wrote Colonel Hewitt expres­
sing his belief that the reclamation amendment applied only 
to existing projects on the park’s east side. According to 
Albright, the reclamation clause did not justify the Glacier
View dam proposal which he described as "a precedent of .
5 7monstrous size and fearful portent. . , The American
Planning and Civic Association buttressed Albright’s inter­
pretation by insisting that the Glacier View project was 
not, in any case, a reclamation scheme. The engineers’ own 
report, they argued,
reveals that of $8,488,000 estimated benefits 
[from the Glacier View project], $7,773,000 
or 91.5 percent, will be realized from power,
7.15 percent from flood control, 0,8 percent 
from recreation, and 0,2 percent from naviga­
tional improvements.^^
The Association concluded that reclamation was not a part of
the project. Therefore, the Glacier Park Act clearly lent no
legislative authority to the project. Anticipating arguments
of those who might wish to cite the reclamation clause to
justify other schemes, the Association was quick to affirm
that the reclamation amendment was not meant to negate the
59principal preservationist features of the Glacier Park Act,
57Letter, Horace Albright to Colonel L. H. Hewitt,
May 21, 1948, Glacier View Dam I .
^^Editorial, Living Wilderness, 27 (Winter 1948-49]: 27.
S9jbid., pp. 27-28.
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National Parks Director Drury echoed much the same 
rationale in opposing Glacier View dam. He noted that the
reclamation clause in the May 11, 1910 Glacier Park Act
was "permissive*' but stated that there was "no evidence to 
indicate that this provision was ever intended to authorize 
the use of park lands for a huge hydroelectric project such 
as the Glacier View Dam p r o p o s a l . D r u r y  admitted that 
the Sherburne reservoir inundated park lands east of the 
Continental Divide. "Regrettable as these losses of rare 
national park lands were," Drury cautioned, "their impor­
tance is relatively minor when compared with the damage to 
the park that would result from the construction of the 
Glacier View power project. . . .
Dam opponents reinforced their anti-dam, anti­
reclamation clause arguments by insisting that proper soil 
conservation and forestry management techniques should be 
used to enhance the ability of the land to regulate water 
flowage. "Maintaining a healthy forest cover on our water­
sheds . . . ," the Master of the Montana State Grange
argued, would be more efficacious than building gigantic
6 2dams. "Throwing dams across our streams," he said, "is
^*^Statement, "Effect of Glacier View Dam Project upon 
Glacier National Park," May 1948, Glacier View Dam I .
^^Ibid.
6 2Testimony, Winton Weydemeyer, Master of the Montana
State Grange, May 25, 1948, Glacier View Dam I.
101
in too many cases only an emergency measure, instituted to
ftovercome in part the results of abuse of our watersheds.*' 
Watershed management and protection, according to the Grange, 
obviated the necessity of building dams.
Preservationist arguments received a serious setback in 
late May of 1948. The entire Columbia River and its tribu­
taries throbbed under the weight of spring floods while the 
Army hearings received testimony. A combination of heavy 
rains and unseasonably warm May weather turned the Northern 
Rockies* heavy snow pack into fast running water and accounted 
for an unusually high runoff throughout the Columbia drainage. 
"Old Man River has a hump in his back like a mad buffalo," 
reported Oregonian staff writer Leverett Richards, "and he *s 
stampeding all over the place. **̂  ̂ National Parks Region Two 
Director L. C. Merriam suspected conspiracy between the Corps 
and mother nature. "The [Kalispell] hearing was apparently 
timed pretty well," he observed, "to coincide with the spring 
run-off in the Columbia River Basin. . , . But not even
the Corps could have guessed that the 1948 flood would be the
For a summary of the watershed arguments see Gordon B, 
Dodds, "The Stream-Flow Controversy: A Conservation Turning
Point," The Journal of American History 46 (June 1969): 59-70.
^^Portland Oregonian, May 29, 1948, p. 3.
^^Memorandum, L. C. Merriam to Newton Drury, June 2,
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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biggest and most destructive since the freshets of 1894.
Disaster struck on Memorial Day 1948. The dikes pro­
tecting the community of Vanport, Oregon (population 18,000) 
sagged under the pressure of the flood-swollen Columbia 
River. Within an hour Vanport was gone. In the words of 
Oregon journalist Richard L. Neuberger, "Vanport City was
reduced to a maelstrom of floating kindling" by the sudden
7influx of water. Miraculously, there were few deaths.
President Truman visited the moribund community early
in June. He remarked: "I hope we can pass a program under
which these disasterous floods will never happen again.
Obviously, with public and Presidential attention engaged
by the flooding Columbia, water resource agencies were under
increased pressure to formulate proposals to guarantee
adequately that the Vanport disaster would not happen again.
Preservationists recognized that the destruction of
Vanport would heighten pressure for building a dam on the
North Fork. Park Service Regional Director Merriam believed
that decisions might be taken quickly by the Corps and Con-
69gress without taking all considerations into account.
Acting Assistant National Parks Director Conrad L. Wirth
^^Richard L, Neuberger, "One of Our Cities is Missing," 
The Nation 166 (June 12, 1948), p. 652.
^^Quoted in Oregonian, June 12, 1948, p. 1.
^^Memorandum, L. C. Merriam to Newton Drury, June 2,
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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warned preservationists that "the Corps of Engineers will 
fight us to the limit on this [Glacier View dam] and . . , 
[they are] armed with a certain amount of superficial ammu­
nition as a result of the recent'floods in the Northwest. ^
Preservationist fears were accurate. At the Columbia
71Basin Inter Agency Committee meeting at Jackson, Wyoming,
in late June, Army Corps of Engineer Colonel Thorton Weaver
stated that the Glacier View dam, in co-ordination with two
other structures, would have reduced the flood crest on the
7 2Columbia River at Portland by four feet. The implications 
of Colonel Weaver's remarks were clear; flood control dams 
on the Columbia's upper tributaries, and especially a dam 
at the Glacier View site, were needed desperately to prevent 
future Vanports.
The Park Service immediately placed A. van V, Dunn, 
Chief of the National Park Service Water Research Branch, 
in charge of investigating the flood control value of Gla­
cier View dam. Dunn was to pare down the importance of a 
flood control structure on the North Fork. Dunn's prelimi­
nary report suited National Park Service objectives ad­
mirably. It characterized flood control storage at the 
Glacier View site as "a relatively gigantic plan for remote
^(^Circular, Conrad Wirth to conservationists, July 1948, 
Glacier View Dam I .
^^The Columbia Basin Inter Agency Committee was a coordi 
nating agency for water-related interests of the Department 
of the Interior.
^^Memorandum, Conrad Wirth to 0. A. Tomlinson, July 7, 
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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contingencies on a minor tributary of the Columbia River.” 
Dunn*3 main conclusion indicated that the North Fork flood- 
crest reached the area of Vanport ten to twelve days after 
the main Columbia crest passed the same point and subsided.
He reasoned, therefore, that a dam at Glacier View would 
account only for three or four inches of the four feet re­
duction Colonel Weaver desired. Dunn’s analysis strongly 
supported the National Park Service contention that the dam
at Glacier View site was primarily a hydroelectric project
73with only incidental flood control values.
National Park Service attempts to demonstrate scientifi­
cally the limited value of flood control on the North Fork 
did not lessen pressure from the Corps or from water control 
agencies within the Department of the Interior. Officials 
within Interior insisted that the Park Service reappraise 
"factually rather than emotionally” their position on Gla­
cier View.^^ Arthur Piper, Chairman of the Pacific Northwest 
Coordinating Committee, called for a Park Service reappraisal 
because he believed Glacier View dam to be an essential ele­
ment in the Army’s comprehensive plan. Piper saw other ad­
vantages in the Glacier View site for a major reservoir.
7 %A. van V. Dunn, "Comments Concerning Hydrological and 
Hydraulic Features of Proposed Glacier View Dam,” August 27, 
1948, Glacier View Dam I .
^^Memorandum, Arthur Piper to Walton Seymour, August 9,
1948, Glacier View Dam III.
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Glacier View would not require expensive relocation of 
communities or major transportation networks. Piper also 
felt that the recreational benefits from the Glacier View 
reservoir would open the North Fork to more tourists. The 
Corps of Engineers agreed with Piper's reasoning. Colonel 
Arthur Wipple complained that "reservoirs either inter­
fered with humans and developed lands or wildlife and wil­
derness, As time passes," he warned, "these problems will
be greater since it is certain that development in the
75Columbia Basin will continue to expand." For Colonel 
Wipple, the problem compounded itself with the passage of 
time and additional development. Undeveloped wildlands 
looked increasingly attractive to the Corps as settlement 
elsewhere precluded the possibility of flooding large areas.
The position of preservationists looked bleak in the 
fall of 1948, Regional Director 0. A. Tomlinson reviewed 
a preliminary draft of the Report Review on the Columbia 
River and Tributaries, Corps of Engineers in the Washington 
office of the Chief of Engineers, Tomlinson reported to 
Drury:
You will find . . . that the Report, as to
the Glacier View target, is a shotgun blast 
hitting in a very good pattern as closely 
as diplomacy will permit to the position of 
the Secretary and the Service. If the re­
port is not confidential we believe that 
every effort now should be made through
•7 r
Quoted in memorandum, George Olcutt to 0. A. Tomlin­
son, August 6, 1948, Glacier View Dam II.
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appropriate means to point out to the 
public the strong desire of the Corps 
to invade Glacier National Park, and 
that it is the time for park conserva­
tionists to redouble their opposition
to the p r o p o s a l . 76
Reading further into the report Tomlinson found the basic
Corps position in support for Glacier View dam:
Intangibles, such as national security, 
loss of life, improved standards of liv­
ing, and stabilization of business employ­
ment over a long period will be impressive 
by-products of this development. . . ,
[T]hese factors constitute potent arguments 
for the development of the valuable water 
resources now largely wasted, and far out­
weigh the few minor disturbances of local 
economy or conflicts with resources of 
lesser significance that cannot be avoided.
Drury decided to re inform conservationist organizations.
He moved, at the same time, to re-institute a direct appeal
from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the
Army to have the Glacier View proposal deleted from the Corps*
reports. Secretary Krug agreed to Drury * s request; a letter
went to Army Secretary Royall on December 3, 1948, W. S.
Moore, Colonel, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, replied to
Krug *s letter four days later:
The Board [of Engineers for Rivers and Har­
bors] appreciates knowing of your interest 
in the proposed improvement and I can assure 
you that in future study of the engineering
7 Memorandum, 0. A. Tomlinson to Newton B. Drury, Novem­
ber 18, 1948, Glacier View Dam I .
7 7Ibid., quoted from Report Review on the Columbia River 
and Tributaries. Corps of Engineers, chapter 3, p. 111-40, 
section 70, Glacier View Dam I.
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and economic features of the Glacier View 
Reservoir the Board will give careful con­
sideration to the views and comments con­
tained in your communication prior to 
formulating its recommendations to the 
Chief of Engineers.78
This must have sounded very much like a form letter to Secre­
tary Krug. It was obvious that the Secretary of War was not 
ready to intercede with the Chief Engineer. Arthur Maass, 
in Muddy Waters, notes that the Secretary of War generally, 
"exercises little, if any real supervision or review over 
the conduct of Engineer civil functions." This, perhaps,
accounts for the polite but negative reply to Krug *s letter
7 9by Colonel Moore. Again, the National Park Service re­
grouped and prepared to argue its case before the Board of 
Engineers meeting at Spokane in January and February 1949.
Proponents of Glacier View dam at the Spokane hearings 
outnumbered opponents by two to one. The pro-dam spokesman 
represented chambers of commerce, bankers, labor unions, 
farm groups and local electrical cooperatives. Don Trealoar, 
chairman of the 700-member Flathead Valley Citizens Committee, 
presented the proponents* strongest arguments in favor of 
Glacier View dam. Reflecting on the *'distressing and damag­
ing floods of 1948,'* Trealoar said, "the time has come for
7 8Letter, W. S. Moore to Secretary Krug, December 7, 
1948, Glacier View Dam I .
7 9 jArthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and
the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v ersity
Press, 1951) , p. 22.
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the Northwest to protect and preserve human life and prop­
erty ahead of any other considerations, especially when
that protection can be secured by such beneficial means as
8 0the building of Glacier View Dam." Much of Trealoar*s
support for the Glacier View dam was linked to opposition
to a proposed dam at Paradise, Montana, which would create
a reservoir one-third the size of Fort Peck Reservoir and
flood the towns of Paradise, Dixon, Moise, parts of Ravalli
and St, Regis, and some Flathead Indian Reservations lands.^^
Glacier View, by comparison, would disrupt little according
to Trealoar; he estimated tax revenue losses to Flathead
County would amount to only $500 annually if Glacier View
8 2dam was constructed. Trealoar professed "unqualified sup -
Q  Zport for the Glacier View Dam. . . ." He discounted detri­
mental effects of the Glacier View Reservoir on North Fork 
wildlife; he did not believe the Park Service estimates on 
the effect of the reservoir on moose populations in particu-
8 0United States Department of the Army, Board of Engi­
neers for Rivers and Harbors, Comprehensive Development of 
the Columbia River: Report of Testimony and Statements, ETC., 
presented at the hearing held January 31, February 1, 2, and 
4, 1949, Volume I: Proceedings in Spokane^ Washington (n.p., 
n.d.), p. 36. Hereafter cited as Proceedings in Spokane, 
Washington.
^^Great Falls Tribune, January 9, 1948, p. 1, Glacier 
View Dam: Senator James E. Murray Papers, University of 
Montana Archives.
8 2Proceedings in Spokane, Washington, p. 37.
®^Ibid., p. 36.
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lar. I "feel sure that . . . some moose in the area . . .
would probably have more to eat if they sought forage at 
slightly higher elevations," he said, "either on the 
benchlands above the flowage areas or in the hugh range 
which is still intact further up the river.
Labor representatives agreed with Trealoar's assess­
ment. "We understand the Park Service looks with disfavor 
on displacing the deer and elk. This local fInternational 
Hod Carriers, Building and Common Labor Union of America, 
Local 1192, A.F.L., Kalispell, MontanaJ looks with equal dis­
favor on the displacing of several thousand workers and their
Q Cfamilies." The consensus among labor representatives at
the hearings was solid:
Civilization must go forward . . . the great
watersheds of the Pacific northwest csicri in 
the United States have already been idle too 
long in rendering the services they should 
to mankind. . . . The plea that the habitat
of certain wild animals will be destroyed is 
of small consequence, considering the human 
factors in the matter and considering the 
modern techniques available for creating 
game preserves and propogating them with the 
desired species of wild life.86
In the scheme of things for the labor representatives, deer,
elk, and moose were reminiscent of cartoonist Jay Norwood
Darling ' s quip that wildlife was like the "bow-legged girl
84ibid., p. 38.
®^Ibid., p. 51. 
86Ibid., p . 41
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of the village . . . Everybody sympathizes with her but
never asks her to the picnic. "Civilization's" values 
clearly had prior claim in the mind of Glacier View pro­
ponents at the Spokane hearings.
The National Parks Association contested the flood 
control value of Glacier View Dam. The Association's rep­
resentative stated that the 1948 flood would have been less 
destructive had "mountain slopes . . . not been logged so
severely. . . . The Association cited, as supportive
evidence, a Forest Service report which noted "that consider­
able water would have been held back until after the 
flood peaks passed, if millions of upland acres in the 
CColumbiaD basin had not been previously deprived of their 
forest cover.
To the surprise of some observers the VJhitefish Cham­
ber of Commerce presented a strong statement in opposition 
to Glacier View Dam. Spokesman Brad Seeley, argued that 
the North Fork area served the highest possible value to the 
region and the nation as part of Glacier National Park.
Another source of unexpected oppositon to the Glacier 
View Dam came from a Montana Power Company spokesman who
^^New York Times. August 25, 1935, Section IV, p. 8. 
88Proceedings in Spokane, Washington, pp. 57-58. 
®^Ibid., p. 58.
5°Ibid., p. 296.
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presented a detailed statement for his company. S. P.
Hogan, Secretary of Montana Power Company, said his company 
had 349,500 kilowatts of installed generating capacity and
56,000 additional kilowatts of supplemental power which 
would be available from Kerr Dam within a few months. In 
addition, Hogan noted that another 66,000 kilowatts of 
power-producing equipment were on order by Montana Power 
Company. Hogan ̂ s message was that his company could satisfy 
all the current and future electrical needs of Montanans; 
federal power dams were neither needed nor wanted.
H, Frank Evans, a long-time summer resident of the North 
Fork, spoke for the Sierra Club, National Parks Association 
and the Wilderness Society in opposition to Glacier View dam. 
Evans presented an articulate summary of National Park Ser­
vice principles to the Army Board, He was intimately familiar 
with the North Fork region of the park, having conducted 
* Wilderness Trips* through Glacier * s back-country for several 
years. "Wilderness is . • . great music . , to visitors
who come *'from the highly mechanized cities of the East"
Evans told his l i s t e n e r s . * * T h e  National park ideal [which 
protects Glacier * s wilderness] stands as a beacon of hope in 
an age that is well blighted by power, war and moral degrada­
tion, . . .  A violation to Glacier National Park . . .
Q 1Ibid., pp. 275-77. 
^^Ibid,, p. 258.
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Evans warned, "would be a severe and heartfelt blow to an
ideal which is dear to the hearts of millions of our 
93people." Evans asked his auditors to consider the affects
of Glacier View dam on the park:
This park would be impaired far beyond the 
stinking, lifeless shores of a fluctuating 
artificial lake. Inundation of the valley 
would destroy a major portion of the park 
wildlife. . . . Wilderness, as an entity,
as a biological whole, would vanish forever, 
for the wildlife is an integral part of the 
wilderness as is the terrifyingly beautiful 
scenery that sweeps the horizons of the 
valley. Already pitifully scarce are those 
areas where wolves, wolverine and the slink­
ing lions and other predators are on a par
with the horned and antlered clans.94
The quintessential point of the Glacier View dam issue, Evans
reminded his audience, was that "Wilderness once removed is
lost f o r e v e r . E v a n s  pushed his justification for Glacier * s
wilderness much further than most defenders of the North Fork,
He cautioned people not to think that the area could withstand
large numbers of people. "Wilderness . . .  is a fragile thing
96which cannot stand the trampling of many feet," he said.
The Park Service usually shied away from such statements, pre­
ferring to accentuate the increasing use and future potential
97of the valley to the park visitors.
95lbid,, pp. 258-59.
94lbid., p. 259.
9Slbid.
^^Ibid., p. 260.
^^Letter, John W. Emmert to Jean Sullivan, April 30,
1948, Glacier View Dam I.
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Evans also tried to educate the Spokane hearing par­
ticipants to the psychological values of preserving the 
North Fork Valley in its pristine condition. "It is im­
mensely satisfying to know of the existence of something 
that you may never feel," he said. "I shall perhaps never
visit England, but I would be spiritually shocked if I knew
9 8it had been destroyed." Evans ended his statements to
the Board of Rivers and Harbors hearing with an adamant
defense of the North Fork Valley:
We will not compromise short of the complete
abandonment of the Glacier View Project. . , .
Sorry, the North Fork is already taken ; you’ll 
have to find something else.99
The Spokane hearings conducted by the Board of Engineers 
for Rivers and Harbors ended formal public review of the 
Glacier View Project. Established procedure dictated that 
the Board and the Chief of Engineers transmit their recom­
mendations to the Congress --through the office of the Bureau
of the Budget in the White House. Both sides in the con­
troversy tried to elicit support for their position from 
high level governmental officials between February and April 
1949. Associated Press reporter Ernest B. Vaccaro asked 
President Truman if he opposed construction of the Glacier 
View dam at a February 17 press conference. Truman replied
98Proceedings in Spokane, Washington, p. 260,
99 Ibid., p , 261.
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to Vaccaro ̂ s enquiry with an evasive answer. "I can*t re­
member enough about the case, Tony. That's the first I had 
heard of that controversy. Is that on the - that the 
Hungry Horse Dam?"
"I think it's Flat Head Dam" or something like that, 
replied Vacarro. "First I heard of it was ten minutes ago. 
[Laughter]."
"Then I happen to know a little bit more about it than 
you do, Tony," Truman r e t o r t e d . M o r e  laughter followed 
Truman's humorous reply but it was clear that the President 
hoped to maintain an aloof posture on the Glacier View issue 
to avoid provoking additional controversy.^
Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug continued to 
press the Secretary of War and the Board of Engineers for 
Rivers and Harbors to drop the Glacier View proposal from 
their list of recommended projects. Explaining his position 
in a letter to Congressman Michael Mansfield, Krug said.
U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, B.C.: Office of the Federal 
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1945-1953), 
Harry S. Truman, Press Conference Statement, February 17, 
1949, p. 138. Hereafter cited as H ST, Public Papers.
^Truman followed essentially the same tactic in the 
spring 1947 controversy over Olympic National Park boundaries 
See, Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics> p. 43; also, in 
January 1953, after enlarging Olympic National Park, Truman 
was asked to comment on his decision. The President feigned 
ignorance--asking if the reporter did not mean Mount Rainier. 
Truman said he had never heard of Olympic National Park!; 
see, HST, Public Papers, p. 1069.
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”I do not deny the need for water control on the Clark 
Fork, but we must find some way to do it without sacrific­
ing Glacier National Park.
Five days later, Krug successfully concluded an agree­
ment with the Chief of Engineers to drop the Glacier View 
dam proposal from the list of recommended projects sub­
mitted by the Corps to Congress. The agreement ended years 
of effort by preservationists to halt dam construction on 
the North Fork. The agreement came as a welcome victory 
for the National Park Service as it girded itself for a con­
frontation with the Bureau of Reclamation over plans to con-
103struct a dam in Dinosaur National Monument.
Several factors lay behind the ability of preservation­
ists to stop the Army Corps of Engineers* recommendation of 
the Glacier View project. National Park Director Newton B.
102 Letter, Julius Krug to Congressman Mansfield, April 6, 
1949, Glacier View Dam II.
^^^The exact reasons for the Corps* willingness to forego 
immediately recommending the Glacier View dam for construction 
are obscure. The Corps* general correspondence files on the 
project apparently have been misplaced or lost. Without these 
papers, it is difficult to assess precisely the Corps * think­
ing in April 1949. See letter, Steven Foster to author,
March 18, 1976, appendix; several other sources were not 
available to the writer for research. The Montana Power Com­
pany failed to answer requests for research material. Like­
wise, Senator Michael Mansfield * s files were not available.
See letter, Mike Mansfield to Professor H. Duane Hampton, 
October 30, 1975, appendix. Mansfield sent no xerox material 
to the author on the Glacier View Project. See also Richard­
son, Dams. Parks, and Politics, passim, pp. 129-186; also, 
Philip Sorotkin and Owen Stratton, The Echo Park Dam Contro­
versy and Upper Colorado River Development, Inter-University 
Case Program, Draft copy loaned by Newton B. Drury to author, 
p. 69.
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Drury and his staff formed a solid cadre around which pre­
servationists could rally. Drury’s unwillingness to com­
promise lost his department some support within Interior 
but strengthened the Park Service’s support from conserva­
tionist organizations.
The Corps of Engineers, itself, was under heavy attack 
in early 1949. The Hoover Commission and its Task Force, 
on Natural Resources recommended to the President that the 
Corps’ civil water functions be transferred to the Depart­
ment of I n t e r i o r . I n  addition. President Truman asked 
the Congress to create a Columbia Valley Administration to 
end piecemeal treatment of Columbia River development.
These factors perhaps weakened the Corps’ resolve. The 
Corps had enough trouble by April 1949; to further embroil 
itself in the Glacier View dam controversy might weaken 
defenses elsewhere.
Preservationists received support from several groups 
not directly interested in park preservation. As noted 
earlier, the Montana Power Company opposed federal dams at 
Glacier View, Hungry Horse, Paradise, Libby or elsewhere. 
Although the Park Service was hesitant about such arguments, 
it probably was happy to have Montana Power Company’s aid 
nevertheless. Montana Senator James E, Murray typified
104Maass, Muddy Waters, p. 113.
^^^Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 19-38. 
lOÔThe Park Service supported the construction of the
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one facet of on-again, off-again support for Glacier View
dam which must have made officers in the Corps rue the day
they first suggested the Glacier View Project, Murray
wanted, above all else, a coordinated plan for Columbia
Basin development. An early sponsor and enthusiast for
the Missouri Valley Authority, Murray withheld support for
the Glacier View dam until he was satisfied that the Corps
and the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to a coordinated com-
107prehensive plan. Murray’s opposition aimed at protect­
ing Montana’s interests--not in stopping the Glacier View 
dam per se. In this effort, many Montanans supported 
Murray’s concern that Montana not be turned into a huge 
reservoir for use by Oregon and Washington.
Preservationists were elated by the victory at Glacier 
View regardless of the complex nature of events and inter­
ests which effectively stopped the project. However, they 
realized that the success was a costly one. The editor of 
the National Parks Magazine assessed the price paid:
, , . it must not be overlooked that this 
struggle has been costly in money and time
Hungry Horse Dam. With one element of the Flathead River 
controlled they hoped pressure for dams on the North Fork 
would be lessened.
1 n 7 Statement, Senator James E, Murray, "Paradise and 
Glacier View," May 10, 1948, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers; 
see also, Montana Reclamation^ssociation statement, "Pro­
posal of the Corps of Engineers to Construct Glacier View Dam 
and Paradise Dam on the Columbia River Watershed of Western 
Montana," April/May 1948, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers; letter, James E. Murray to J . SI McFarland, June 19, 1948, 
Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers.
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not only to the many groups and individ­
uals that fought it, but also to the tax­
payers in financing the exploration of the 
dam site and the drafting plans. Many 
headaches and waste of great sums of money 
could be avoided if, once and for all, the 
officials of the Bureau of Reclamation and 
the Army Engineers would realize that the 
national parks and monuments have been set 
aside by law to be preserved as nature made 
them.108
The editorial appeal fell on many deaf ears. The April 11, 
1949 agreement not to recommend the Glacier View reservoir 
site was a matter of convenience on the part of one water 
development agency, not a recognition of preservationist 
principles.
^*^^Editor ial, "Glacier View - A Victory," National 
Parks Magazine 23 (July-September 1949):9.
CHAPTER VI 
EPILOGUE: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
It takes time to persuade men to do 
even what is for their own good.
Thomas Jefferson
The Glacier View dam controversy did not terminate in 
April 1949. The Corps summarized its position on the dam 
in a statement on Principles and Responsibilities for de­
velopment of the Columbia River Basin in this manner:
The Glacier View project, which is one of the 
most economically favorable projects consid­
ered for the [comprehensive Columbia River 
Basin] plans, and which is approved by the 
State of Montana and local interests gener­
ally, is strongly opposed by many because it 
would encroach upon Glacier National Park.
The statement concluded that, in view of the strong opposi­
tion, the project should not be authorized "at this 
time. . . .
Although the Corps generally respected the April agree­
ment to look elsewhere in the Columbia Basin for water stor­
age sties, there were numerous attempts to have Glacier View
U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 
The Columbia River: Final Letters of Transmittal and Com­
ments by Yhe Affected States and of Federal Agencies, vol. 1 
llvashington, U.C.: Government Printing Ottice, T93UT» P- 25,
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dam constructed by other interests. Demands for the dam
were most often local. Western Montana Congressman Mike
Mansfield introduced House Resolution 6153 in August,
1949, seeking immediate authorization and construction of
Glacier View dam. Mansfield reiterated earlier arguments
that the dam would be of immediate benefit to the regional
economy with minimal effects on Glacier National Park. He
believed that the North Fork was not a crucial segment of
Glacier since it was
separated from the rest of the park by a 
divide with very poor roads leading into 
it, and [because] . . . very few of the 
park’s visitors go into this area.
In Mansfield’s opinion, the Glacier View dam
would not affect the beauty of the park in 
any way but would make it more beautiful 
by creating a large lake over ground that 
. . . has no scenic attraction. , , . As to 
wild game now occupying this area, there 
are vast areas just as good nearby that the 
game could move into.2
National Park Service officials were surprised by Mans­
field’s attempt to short-circuit the April agreement. How­
ever, they speculated that H.R. 6153 probably represented 
”a gesture . . . for local consumption . . . while the House 
[of Representatives] is in recess.”^
Letter, Mike Mansfield to Julius Krug, February 25, 
1949, Glacier View Dam IV. Mansfield entered the letter to 
Krug in the Congressional Record in support of his position 
on the Glacier View project.
^Letter, Charles A, Rickey, Acting Chief, Land and Rec-
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Mansfield’s bill never came out of the Committee on 
Public Lands. Congress apparently preferred to abide by 
established procedures and consider the Glacier View dam only 
as part of the Corps* survey reports.  ̂ Mansfield pushed again 
for construction of the Glacier View dam during the Korean 
War, He maintained that the dam was essential for successful 
prosecution of the conflict.  ̂ President Truman had decided, 
however, not to authorize any new water development projects 
while the war continued. The President’s decision undermined 
Mansfield’s efforts.^
Local business groups, farmers, and labor unions sup­
ported Mansfield’s pro-Glacier View dam position. The com­
pletion of Hungry Horse Dam in the early 1950s, for example, 
reawakened local interest in large federal projects at other 
potential sites near Kalispell, Daily Inter Lake editor 
William B. Sweetland explained the new interest:
It is felt that there must be some effort 
made to provide other projects of the type
reational Planning, National Park Service, to Edward Whelen, 
Chairman, Conservation Committee, Brooklyn Bird Club, N.Y., 
November 9, 1949, Glacier View Dam IV; and confidential 
memorandum, Arthur E. Demaray to Region Two Director, Na­
tional Park Service, September 2, 1949, Glacier View Dam IV.
^Memorandum, Conrad Wirth to Region Two Director, Jan­
uary 31, 1950, Glacier View Dam IV.
^Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 59; and 
letter, Mansfield to Walter Nye, Decemoer 9, 1950, Glacier 
View Dam, Murray Papers.
^Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 73.
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of Hungry Horse dam . . . which will help
assure a sustained, aggressive economy in 
this region.'
Sweetland and other community leaders applied pressure for 
federal dams --and Glacier View dam in particular--whenever 
political or economic conditions seemed to favor such a 
move.
Not all interest in the Glacier View dam was local.. 
Paul Raver, chief of the Bonneville Power Administration, 
actively pushed for the project in the early 1950s; Michael 
Straus, Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner, strongly sup­
ported Glacier View dam construction. Straus was unhappy 
with the Corps* decision not to recommend immediately the 
Glacier View site. He commented, "I think the Department 
[of Interior] is wrong, and I am going to see that it
o[Glacier View] is built - preferably by Reclamation." 
Secretaries of Interior were reluctant to become embroiled 
in the controversy, Horace Albright warned Douglas McKay
^Letter, William B. Sweetland to James E. Murray, Jan­
uary 27 , 1955, Glacier View Dam. Murray Papers; see also, 
**Labor Petition for Glacier View Dam," quoted in Daily Inter 
Lake. October 9, 1955 , p. 1; Letter, Charles Byers, Business 
Manager, Local Union 768, International Brotherhood of Elec­
trical Workers, Kalispell, Montana to Stanley E, Thompson, 
December 13, 1954, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers; and let­
ter, James E. Murray to Stanley E, Thompson, January 27, 1955, 
Glacier View Dam. Murray Papers in which Murray gives the fol­
lowing advice: "I think it would be highly desirable if labor 
and other groups in that area [Kalispell] would organize an 
association for the purpose of promoting interest in the con­
struction of this dam [Glacier View]."
g
Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 59-60.
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that the Glacier View issue was potential "political TNT" 
for both Interior and the Eisenhower administration. McKay 
reiterated departmental opposition to the site and Reclama­
tion quickly adjusted its statements to reflect the Secre-
qtary*s position.
The initial Park Service response to continued solici­
tation for the Glacier View structure was cautious. Direc­
tor Drury and Region Two Director Lawrence Merriam decided 
that the Park Service "should not make any concerted effort 
to oppose the Glacier View Dam at the present but that it 
was quite alright [sic] to talk to individuals along the 
line of opposing the dam. . . . Several University of
Montana professors, many of them friends of Mike Mansfield, 
were shown through Glacier. The Park Service hoped this 
indirect method would convince Mansfield to modify his posi­
tion on the North Fork dam.
Glacier Park officials also began a survey of Glacier's 
value to the Montana economy during the summer of 1949. 
N.P.S. Director Drury had suggested, as early as February 
1949, that such a survey was necessary to "bring this [Gla­
cier View Dam issue] down to e a r t h . T h e  tourist survey
®Ibid., p. 109.
Memorandum, John Emmert to Region Two Director, Na- 
tional Park Service, September 19, 1949, Glacier View Dam IV.
^^Memorandum, Drury to Region Two Director, National
Park Service, February 16, 1949, Glacier View Dam I. National
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contacted 3495 out-of-state visitors who camped at least one 
night in the park. The survey results suggested that 75 
percent of the people interviewed attributed their visit to 
Montana directly to a desire to see Glacier National Park. 
The survey also listed the cities in Montana that benefited 
most from tourist travel to Glacier Park: Missoula, Great
Falls, Havre, Helena, and Kalispell.
In 1954 tourist surveys placed the direct economic 
value of Glacier National Park to the regional economy at 
fifteen million dollars. The 1954 survey was quick to point 
out that travel to the park grew substantially each year.
The implication was that local communities could count on 
the park’s value to increase annually. Park officials’ argu 
ments were surprisingly simple. They contended that the 
people of the area could not have both dam construction and 
increasing tourist travel. ”If Glacier National Park is 
despoiled by encroachments incompatible with its wilderness 
character,” park officials warned, "it will no longer at­
tract these visitors - particularly after the wilderness
Park Service Director Steven Mather had tried to convince 
state and local leaders of the potential "tourist gold" and 
economic importance of national parks for regional economies 
as early as 1916. See, Donald C. Swain, "The Passage of the 
National Park Service Act of 1916," Wisconsin Magazine of 
History (Autumn 1966): 8.
^^Harold J. Hoflich and M. E. Beatty, "Glacier National 
Park Visitors in Montana -- 1949," Regional Study No. 1, 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Montana State Uni­
versity (Missoula: May 1950), pp. 1-2.
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becomes even more precious to Americans." Dam projects, 
they concluded, "could easily compare to the 'killing of 
the goose that laid the golden eggs'.
The National Park Service was not content, however, 
with the generally defensive nature of lobbying and economic 
surveys. In 1951 the Service took the offensive. Arthur E, 
Demaray, National Park Service Director succeeding Drury, 
approved a plan to construct a highway from Apgar to the 
U.S. Forest Service road west of the North Fork River. The 
proposed highway would continue up the North Fork Valley on 
the Forest Service side, pass over Akamina Pass, and con­
nect with an existing highway near Waterton Lakes Townsite 
in Canada. The highway would complete the western segment 
of a figure-eight loop transportation system encircling the 
park.
Demaray*s approval of the project was an about-face 
from previous park policy. Earlier, Regional Director 
Lawrence Merriam warned against promoting North Fork travel.
l^Mational Park Service, "The Glacier View Dam," Item 
one. Glacier National Park Conservation Problems, June 20,
1955, p. 5, Glacier View D a m , Murray Papers.
Frank Evans, "Letter to the Editor," National Parks 
Magazine 27 [April-June 1953]: 69. The Forest Service interest 
in the improvement of the North Fork Road stemmed from the fact 
that timber harvest in the North Fork Valley hinged directly on 
good roads. See, John R. Castles, "Timber Management Plan: 
Glacier View Working Circle," (Flathead National Forest: 1949), 
p. 8, and personal interview with Castles, December 19, 1975. 
Drury's resignation perplexed preservationsists. Bernard De 
Voto suspected that Drury's resignation reflected the warfare 
between agencies about dams in Dinosaur, Kings Canyon and Gla­
cier. See, Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics, p. 65.
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Merriam told Glacier Superintendent Emmert that additional 
travel there would bring "considerable pressure for road 
improvement. . . ." Primary "highways are not contem­
plated," Merriam said, "since they would ruin the wilder­
ness aspect of that section of the park. ^
The change in policy for the North Fork reflected 
National Park Service uneasiness with continued pressure 
for Glacier View dam. In 1953, Emmert called the loop 
road to Waterton "the best defense we can make against the 
Glacier View Dam. . . ." Acting Region Two Director Howard
Baker explained the National Park Service support of the 
North Fork highway, "We do not see," he said, "how the
tremendous wilderness values of the west slope can other -
17wise be enjoyed by the public."
Anticipating increased travel into the North Fork, the 
Park Service built two new campgrounds at Quartz and Logging
Memorandum, Emmert to Region Two Director, April 13, 
1949, and memorandum. Region Two Director, to Emmert, April 
19, 1949, Glacier View Dam II. During Drury * s Directorship 
of the National Park ^e^rvice opposition to access roads 
reached its height. Drury revealed his attitude toward 
roads in a statement to wilderness buff Robert Marshall, "I 
am against roads," he told Marshall, "I am death on roads." 
Quoted in Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, p. 8.
^^The North Fork highway also would lessen pressure on 
the Going-to-the-Sun Road. Personal interview with John 
Emmert, December 20, 1975.
17Memorandum, John Emmert to Region Two Director,
April 13, 1949, and memorandum. Region Two Director to John 
Emmert, April 19, 1949, Glacier View Dam II.
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Lakes in 1953, "to avert pressure for the Glacier View dam."^^ 
The loop highway and campground developments were National 
Park Service attempts to justify, by increased usage, the 
continued park status of the North Fork Valley. By occupying 
the reservoir area and increasing visitor 'enjoyment* there, 
the Service hoped to undercut dam proponent a r g u m e n t s . H o w ­
ever, the Park Service efforts severely conflicted with ear­
lier defenses of the valley as a wilderness retreat. The 
highway and campground promotions clearly illustrated how 
far the National Park Service could be pushed to 'protect* 
the North Fork from reservoir inundations. The last line of
defense in the Park Service strategy was to develop the wil-
2 0derness in order to 'save * it.
The pressure for construction of the Glacier View dam
18Annual Reports. Superintendent. 1951-1960, Central 
Files, Park Service Headquarters, West Glacier, Montana,
1952, pp. 4-11, quoted in Buchholtz, "Historical Dichotomy," 
pp. 68-69.
^^The road building tactic was nothing new to preserva­
tionists. For example, the Sierra Club attempted to put a 
road into the Hetch Hetchy Valley in 1909 to stem the tide 
for reservoir construction. See, Holway R. Jones, John Muir 
and the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Publication, 1965), p. 122. Approximately 500,000 
motorists were expected to use the loop highway each year.
See, Bolle, "The Basis of Multiple Use Management," p. 211.
2 0The highway from Apgar to the Forest Service North Fork 
road was completed in 1967. Local preference for the status 
quo and decreasing pressure for Glacier View dam after the 
mid-1950s contributed to the Park Service dropping plans for 
completing the loop highway system. See, U.S., Department of 
Agriculture, Flathead River. Wild and Scenic River Report 
(Kalispell: July 1973), p. 64.
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abated somewhat after the mid-1950s. The inability of re­
source development agencies to establish dams elsewhere 
within the National Park system cooled enthusiasm for such 
projects. Specifically, the unsuccessful Bureau of Recla­
mation attempt to place a major water storage facility at 
Echo Park in Dinosaur National Monument increased preser­
vationist resolve to keep the park system free of water .
21control structures. The Echo Park defeat was a clear
lesson to water development proponents in the Columbia River
Basin. Montana Congressman Lee Metcalf carefully analyzed
the status of the Glacier View project in light of the Echo
Park decision, Metcalf bluntly stated to Inter Lake editor
William B . Sweetland that
introduction of . . . [Glacier View Dam] 
legislation would, in my opinion, be 
detrimental to the development of water 
resources of the entire northwest, be­
cause it would get us into a controversy 
like the one which developed around the 
Upper Colorado Project. . . .  I don’t 
want any more opposition to our Montana 
water resource development than we al­
ready have, I d o n ’t want to have the 
whole development of the Upper Columbia 
identified with an attempted invasion of 
Glacier National Park as the Upper Colo­
rado is identified with the attempted in­
vasion of the D i n o s a u r . 22
The lesson of Echo Park was clear to Metcalf. Many other
Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics, pp. 129-152 
deals with the Echo Park controver^syl
^^Letter, Lee Metcalf to William B. Sweetland, Jan­
uary 28, 1956, Glacier View Dam, Murray Papers.
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leaders came to the same realization. By 1957, even Mon­
tana Senator Mike Mansfield told constituents that chances 
for constructing Glacier View dam were "nil.'* Mansfield 
suggested efforts be concentrated on more probable proj- 
ects.
Current discussion of dams on the North Fork River re­
volves around debate of the Wild and Scenic River status 
for the rivers of the Upper Flathead Basin. The National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 directed the U.S. Forest 
Service to study 219 miles of the Upper Flathead River for 
possible inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic River
S y s t e m . I f  the North Fork is included in the system,
2 5future dam construction would be prohibited. The Corps of 
Engineers and the Federal Power Commission oppose Wild and 
Scenic River status for the North Fork. Both agencies feel 
the possibility of dam construction should remain open for 
future hydroelectric and storage needs. However, the 
Forest Service recommends inclusion of the entire North Fork
2 3Quoted in (Columbia Falls) Hungry Horse News, Octo­
ber 25 , 19 57 , p . 1.
^^Wild and Scenic Rivers Report, p. 2.
^^Ibid,, p. 50.
^^Ibid., p. 16, citing letters from the Corps of Engi- 
neers and the Federal Power Commission to the Regional 
Forester, Flathead National Forest, dated March 8, 1973 
and March 20, 1973, respectively.
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River within the Wild and Scenic River S y s t e m . C o n g r e s s  
must now decide the relative merits between resource de­
velopment and preservation.
Sixty-five years have passed since the establishment 
of Glacier Park. The difficulty of protecting the natural 
environment from encroachment by those who would develop 
and utilize the park is amply illustrated during those years. 
The Sixty-first Congress, debating the Glacier Park bill, 
was unwilling to establish solid guidelines for the park’s 
preservation. In fact, the weight of the Organic Act was 
clearly on the side of protecting both past and future de­
velopment. Park officials were burdened, therefore, with 
an ambiguous and contradictory Organic Act. They rode the 
back of a fitful tiger whenever they tried to justify pres­
ervation of park landscape.
It is probable that park officials could not have pre­
vented reclamation developments east of the Continental 
Divide even had they desired to do so. The Sherburne Reser­
voir, or its equivalent, was a foregone conclusion when 
President Taft signed the May 1910 Organic Act. It did not 
matter that the Sherburne Dam was not part of the original 
reclamation scheme. The act allowed ’'any area" to be de­
veloped for reclamation purposes. The surprising thing was 
that more areas were not developed.
^^Ibid., p. 104.
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West of the Continental Divide the situation was simi­
lar. Fortunately, the demand for water control structures 
came after the National Park Service developed an abhor­
rence for such projects. But, again, Glacier's Organic Act 
provided no solid framework on which preservationists could 
fall back. And worse, the act provided no strong statement 
to the general public as to the park’s purpose. In part, 
the misunderstandings among the local communities can be 
traced to the failure to define the preservationist prin­
ciple. Not surprisingly, therefore, local interests pointed 
to the Organic Act as justification for development. For 
example, a 1955 labor union petition for the Glacier View 
dam noted :
it is apparent that as early as 1910 intelli­
gent and far-sighted people recognized that 
portions of the park would be needed for . . , 
[reclamation] purposes by an enlightened and 
expanding people. The time foreseen even at 
that early date has arrived and we feel that 
this portion of the park should now be used 
for the purpose for which it was intended 
and for which reservation has been made in 
the very act of c r e a t i o n . 28
The Park Service response to such statements was feeble and 
historically inaccurate. Officials argued that the reclama­
tion provision
pertained to a project on the east side of 
the Park entailing two low earthfilled dams -
Quoted in Daily Inter Lake, October 9, 1955, p. 1, 
Senator Lee Metcalt Papers, T] 27-5, dams. Glacier View, 
1955-1956, Montana Historical Society, Helena, Montana.
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Sherburne and Lower Two Medicine - along 
the eastern boundary of the Park for irri­
gation needs on and adjacent to the Black- 
feet Indian Reservation. These projects 
were underway when the Park was established 
and were recognized to be but minor im­
poundments . 29
Park Service officials were on safer grounds when they main­
tained that the Glacier View project was not a reclamation 
project but a flood control and hydroelectric scheme. Yet 
even that argument could cut both ways ; after the 1964 
flood in and around Glacier Park, the Bureau of Reclamation 
assumed responsibility for future development projects on 
the North Fork River.
In the final analysis the Glacier Park Organic Act 
offered little support to the Park Service position for 
preserving the natural environment of the park. The Ser­
vice tended, therefore, to cite later legislation that con-
31tained stronger preservationist statements. Finally, the
Park Service appealed to people to recognize the fact that
the 1910 legislation no longer suited the post-World War II
need for undisturbed wilderness, Drury told people
Civilization is encroaching on these great 
wilderness areas all over our land; what 
remains of them becomes increasingly pre-
^^National Park Service, "The Glacier View Dam Project," 
pp. 2-3, Glacier View Dam II.
^^Letter, H. R. Stivers, Acting Regional Director, Bureau 
of Reclamation, to author, March 3, 1976.
^^Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535); and Act of 
August 22, 1914 (38 Stat. 699),
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cious to present-day America, and will be 
in even greater degree to Americans of the 
future. It will be a sorry day when we 
conclude that other needs are so compelling 
that we can no longer preserve them.32
Drury's appeal recognized that the resource decisions made 
during the heated Progressive conservation movement debates 
did not provide adequate protection for America's shrinking 
wilderness areas. Yet Drury's appeal and the general de­
bate on the Glacier View issue underscored an even more sig­
nificant fact ; preservationists at mid-century were no more 
willing than their Progressive Era cousins to confront head- 
on the preservationist issue at Glacier. No one suggested 
that the Park Service ask Congress to repeal the reclama­
tion clause in the original Glacier Park Act. They evi­
dently felt that such a move would be frought with too many 
pitfalls. As a result, the amendment remains to this day 
in the act--a potential nightmare threatening the preser­
vationist principle.
? 7Statement, Newton Drury for inclusion in the Army 
Corps of Engineers Columbia River Basin Report, Glacier 
View Dam 11.
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October 30, 1975
Professor H. D. Hampton 
Department of History 
University of Montana 
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Hampton:
This will acknowledge your letter of the l6th and 
the enclosed letter from Mr* Oppedahl.
I wish it were possible for me to comply with the 
request made by Mr. Oppedahl, but, unfortunately, while some 
of my files for those years have been sent to the University, 
in checking, I find that the file on the Glacier View Dam 
project was not sent out because this is a project on which 
there might be further discussion in the future, and on 
files of this kind, I feel that they should be kept here for 
future reference.
I will, however, be glad to go through the file on 
this project to see if I can duplicate some of the information 
in the file and send it to Mr, Oppedahl, It is my hope that 
this material will be helpful to him in the research he is 
doing,
With best personal wishes, I am
Sincerely yours.
cc— R. James Oppedahl 
510 North Orange St, 
Missoula, Montana 59801
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U nited  States Departm ent o f the Interior
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION 
FEDERAI. BUILDING & U.S. COURTHOUSE 
BOX 013-550 WEST FORT STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83721
123. (WA;.
Mr. R. James Oppedahl Department of History University of Montana Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Mr. Oppedahl:
This responds to your several questions regarding Glacier View and Smokey Range damsites (Upper Flathead River Basin),
The Bureau of Reclamation completed an information report on the Spruce Park development on the Middle Fork of the Flathead River in 1961. These studies were discontinued because of strong public sentiment against the effects the project would have on the fish and wildlife resources of the area. Studies of sites on the North Fork at Glacier View were reported in 1948, and at Smokey Range in 1962 by the Corps of Engineers. These studies were also deferred because of strong objection to these develop­ments and the effects they would have on Glacier National Park.
The need for local flood control measures were overwhelmingly demonstrated by the devastating flood that occurred during June 1964. That flood caused an estimated $24 million in flood damages and required evacuation of about6,000 people due to flooding caused by the uncontrolled flows of the North and Middle Forks of the Flathead River. On the South Fork of the Flathead River, Hungry Horse Reservoir stored and held back virtually all of the flood runoff produced. This flood was different than previously recorded floods in that it was caused primarily by rain. Floods similar to that of June 1964 may be repeated and even be exceeded in the future.
As a result of the 1964 flood, the Montana State Legislative Assembly requested the Bureau of Reclamation to reactivate its studies of storage sites on the Flathead River. The Corps of Engineers, under separate authority, was also directed to review previous reports and studies 
related to the Flathead and Clark Fork Basins.
In May 1965, the Montana Power Company and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation filed joint license applica­tions with the Federal Power Commission for projects Buffalo Rapids
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sit6S no. 2 dnd 4@ This proposal led to a directive from the Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of Reclamation requesting the Bureau to broaden the scope of its studies to include both the upper and lower Flathead River Basins. Subsequently (about mid 1965), the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers initiated a joint investigation for development of known storage and run of river sites in the entire Flathead-Clark Fork Basin for flood control and hydropower. The findings of that joint study were published in September 1967, "Memorandum Report on Clark Fork Basin, Montana, for the Federal Power Commission."
It was determined in the above mentioned study (September 1967) that a minimum of about 1,500,000 acre-feet of flood control storage on the North Fork and at least 500,000 acre-feet of flood control storage on the Middle Fork of the Flathead River would be necessary to effectively control floods. It was also decided that the Bureau of Reclamation would take the lead and utilize all available information from previous reports together with developing new information to report on the storage sites in the upper and lower Flathead River Basin.
Glacier View Project as reported on by the Corps of Engineers in 1948, included a dam and reservoir with 3,160,000 acre-feet of active storage capacity. A public hearing was held May 29, 1948, at Kalispell, Montana. Several local committees, chambers of commerce, and labor councils favored the project, but the predominance of local sentiment favored the views of the National Park Service in opposition to the project. The desirability of minimal encroachment of the reservoir on Glacier National Park lands, together with the requirement of at least 1,500,000 acre-feet of storage to control the North Fork led to the resizing of the project by the Bureau of Reclamation for the joint studies (September 1967-Bureau and Corps); resulting in a full pool elevation of 3,600 feet with 132 feet of draw­down, thereby providing 1,510,000 acre-feet of active storage and about 275 feet of head on the powerplant (resized project).
Smokey Range Project was reported on by the Corps in 1962 (HD 403) and included a dam and reservoir with 1,510,000 acre-feet of usable storage capacity. The reservoir at full pool would provide a total capacity of1,650,000 acre-feet. The storage capacity of this project was not changed in the joint studies, September 1967. A full pool elevation of 3,550 feet with 170 feet of drawdov/n would provide 1 ,510,000 acre-feet of active 
storage and about 354 feet of head on the powerplant.
Development at either Glacier View or Smokey Range sites are mutuallyexclusive in that the construction of one would preclude development ofthe other. Comparing the project from the 1967 report, Smokey Rangesite is located about 10 miles farther downstream, the reservoir would encroach to a lesser extent on Glacier National Park lands than Glacier View Reservoir (resized for 1,510,000 acre-feet of active storage). Also, a
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potential of about 80 more feet of head can be developed at the Smokey Range site compared with Glacier View; thereby, providing more hydro­energy and capacity from the same river flows. Smokey Range was selected as the more favorable development on the North Fork.
Question 1 —  Why was Glacier View Project shifted from the Army Corps of Engineers to the Bureau of Reclamation in 1964?
Under the joint Bureau-Corps study published September 1967 as "Memorandum Report on Clark Fork Basin, Montana, for the Federal Power Commission," the Regional Office (Boise, Idaho) of the Bureau and the Division Office (Portland, Oregon) of the Corps divided up the initial work load. The Bureau resized Glacier View.
Question 2 —  Have any public hearings been held on the Glacier View Project since the Bureau of Reclamation assumed responsibility?
No.
Question 3 —  Can you indicate the current status, as of 1976, of the Bureau of Reclamation plans for Glacier View site?
The Bureau does not have detailed studies underway at either site at the present time. However, these two sites are being con­sidered in a broad overview of hydropower potentials in the west as a part of Reclamation's Western Energy Expansion Appraisal Study.
Question 4 —  Does the Regional Office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Boise retain the complete project file along with memorandum to and from national headquarters? Are these archives available to responsible 
researchers?
The Regional Office has a file on our Flathead Studies. This file is available for researchers. Hov/ever, with the exception of a short review of potential irrigable lands in the Flathead, 
our studies came to a stop in 1967. The joint report (Bureau and Corps) for the Federal Power Commission was completed in that year. The Federal Power Commission continues to update that report. Also, the Corps of Engineers has updated some cost data and reevaluated project contributions of some Clark Fork projects recently as requested by the Montana State Study 
Team and Bonneville Power Administration.
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The Federal Power Commission, Bonneville Power Administration, and Division Office of the Corps in Portland may be the best sources for continuing research for both the North Fork Sites and others in the 
basin.
Sincerely yours, 
iXcting Regional Director
^ 2
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SEATTLE DISTRICT. CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
P.O. BOX C 3755  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98124
NPSEN-PL-BP 2̂.3 WAR 1S7£ ^8 ^arch 1976
Mr. R. James Oppedahl 
510 North Orange Street 
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Mr. Oppedahl:
This is in response to your letter of 20 February 1976 requesting that 
we further search our files for material on planning of a dam on 
Glacier View dams ite on the North Fork of the Flathead River. We have 
again searched our records and find no trace of correspondence or 
other planning material on the Glacier View project which you have not 
already seen. In July 1954, 56 cartons of files covering records from 
1943 to 1948 were shipped to our Kansas City archives. Three of the 
cartons shipped failed to reach their destination and our records show 
one of these cartons contained material on the Columbia River 308 
report. We now suspect that the missing Glacier View files may be 
among those that were lost.
Since 1954, the Seattle District files stored in Kansas City have been 
returned to Seattle and are currently stored in the Federal Archive 
Center, Upon receiving your 20 February 1976 letter, we contacted 
Mr. Philip Lothyan, Chief, Archives Branch, Federal Archives Center,
6125 Sandpoint Way, Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98115. He has 
checked his records of stored files and can find no trace of files 
concerning the Glacier View dam project.
We contacted our Division office in Portland, Oregon, in an attempt 
to obtain for you at least part of the correspondence concerning the 
Glacier View project. Mr. Lynn Jackson, Records management Officer, 
has located files in storage which contain correspondence concerning 
the Columbia River 308 report on many planning studies, including Glacier 
View damsite studies. Unfortunately, these files contain very little 
of the coordination correspondence between various agencies and public 
officials. Most correspondence is related to management matters; i.e., 
time scheduling, funding, and progress reporting. Correspondence on 
Glacier View damsite studies is scattered throughout three file card­
board cartons. Retrieval of Glacier View correspondence would require 
about 16 hours of file search at a cost of $6.50 per hour, with a minimum
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NPSEN-PL-BP
Mr. R. James Oppedahl
charge of $3.50. Reproduction of any correspondence would be charged 
at the rate of $2.00 for the first six pages and 5 cents per sheet for 
each additional page. If you are interested in proceeding with this 
search, please contact me by phone; (206) 764-3622, or by letter, to
make the necessary arrangements.
I am sorry for any inconvenience I have caused you and hope that the 
files which I finally located will assist you in your research project
Sincerely yours,
STEVEN FOSTER, P.E.
Study Manager
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THEMONTAMA POWER COMPANY
GENERAL OFFICES: 40  EAST BROADWAY. BUTTE. MONTANA 59701- TELEPHONE 406 f  723 5421
SERVING y o u OUR BUSINESS
May 27, 1976
R. James Oppedahl
510 North Orange Street
Missoula, MT 5 9801
Dear Sir:
In response to your letter of March 5, concerning the 
Glacier View Dam, I was unable to find anything in our files 
pertaining to that project.
I just learned from our chief engineer that The Montana 
Power Company took no position in the Corps of Engineer 
proposal. He was aware of the two proposed sites along the 
North Fork. Smokey Range, being just upstream from the 
Glacier View site, knew of no involvement of The Montana 
Power Company in either proposal.
I apologize for the delay in responding to your inquiry.
Yours very truly.
Carl R. Anderson, Manager 
Environmental Protection Department
CRA/nb/4:4
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Artist's conception of Glacier View Dam. Glacier National Park Archives.
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Glacier View Dam reservoir at elevation 3725. May 20, 1948. 
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